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America Singing: The Role
of Custom and Usage in the
Thoroughbred Horse Business
BY ROBERT S. MILLER*
INTRODUCTION
Is there a meaningful, identifiable body of American "equine
law"-a separate voice, apart from all of the others, singing
different words and tunes?
Horse traders are different from the rest of us. They are,
for example, the paradigm practitioners of the art of "puffing."'I
"Fancy has an influence in such cases." ' 2 Apart from the rather
pedestrian differences in the application of state' and federal
tax4 laws, and of the treatment of equine securities5 and security
* Partner in law firm of Miller, Griffin & Marks, P.S.C.; B.A. 1960, Haverford
College; 1960-61, Oxford University; LL.B. 1964, Harvard University.
I Harting v. Cebrian, 51 P.2d 195, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936).
2 McKenzie v. Stretch, 53 Ill. App. 184, 187 (1893).
See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 5721-90 (West Cum. Supp. 1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.531 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
4 See Brown, Tax Proposal Could Change Industry, The Thoroughbred Times,
Sept. 20, 1985, at 7, col. 1; Craigo, Tax Planning for the Horse Industry, TAX IDEAS
(P-H), Dec. 18, 1984, at 17,011. As in other areas of the law, "customary commercial
practice" may affect a tax result. Proposed Reg. § 1.168-4(d)(2)(ii)(A) (1985). No less
than four articles in Vol. 70, No. 4, of the KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL were devoted
principally to tax matters.
I See Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985);
Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131 (1981-82); Comment,
Equine Syndications: Are They Securities?, 6 N. Ky. L. REv. 361 (1979). Classification
as a security may be affected by "terms or courses of dealing which establish their
character in commerce". Securities and Exchange Commission v. C.J. Joiner Leasing
Corporation, 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
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interests, 6 is there some role for the horseman's "fancy" that a
court can recognize? Is there some way, within the rule of law,
under which he can write and sing his special song?
More directly: Does the nature of the thoroughbred horse
business7 call for substantively different rules in any reasoned
way? The only source of such rules would be the special customs
and usages of the industry itself. The popular wisdom in the
thoroughbred horse industry is that Marsh v. Gentry3 dispenses
forever with the notion that the customs and usages 9 of the
industry itself will determine the relations among its participants.
The industry views that case as saying instead that the courts
will impose standard, generalized doctrines on the industry. The
6 See Trimble v. North Ridge Farms, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985). See also
Lester, Security Interests in Thoroughbred and Standardbred Horses: A Transactional
Approach, 70 Ky. L.J. 1065 (1981-82). The result of the determination made under
Section VII below will flow back to the perfection of security interests. See In re
Blankenship-Cooper, Inc., 39 U.C.C. Rep. 1008, 1012 (N.D. Tex. 1984), which cites
Lee v. Cox, 18 U.C.C. Rep. 807 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), for the proposition that the
"alerting" of third parties perfects interests in horse registration papers.
I In this Article we discuss only the thoroughbred horse business, the most
prominent in the sporting press, and the one that generates the largest amount of dollars
per transaction-thus, the best candidate for substantial litigation. It will always be
necessary to be clear that customs vary among different horse industries. For example,
the quarter horse industry has one custom which could not be more different from that
of the thoroughbred industry: "The record reveals a custom in the horse auction business,
and one announced and followed by McKnight, that when a mare is sold under the
representation that she had been bred, such representation conveys a reasonable as-
sumption that the mare is pregnant or in foal." McKnight v. Bellamy, 449 S.W.2d 706
(Ark. 1970). However, a custom in the show horse business appears to be like that of
the thoroughbred business: "Expert testimony in the record, which is uncontradicted,
indicates that, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the method of breeding is
usually at the option of the owner of the stallion, and that the owner of the mare
accepts the risk of injury by the stallion or by other mares while the mare is at the stud
farm." Sheets v. Robin, 380 So.2d 137 (La. App., 1979).
642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
The words "custom" and "usage" are used interchangeably in this Article,
except as otherwise noted. In many cases and literature, they are sometimes used to
make distinctions. See, e.g., Aulich v. Craigmyle, 59 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Ky. 1933) (The
court claimed to use the term "custom" interchangeably with "usage," yet made the
distinction that "[i]f the usage leaves some material element to the right of exercising
an option, or discretion, of one of the parties, it does not constitute a custom."); C.
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 135-36 (7th ed. 1964) (Not all usages of a particular trade
meet the requirements of a proper custom.); Reid, In Accordance With Usage: the
Authority of Custom, the Stamp Act Debate, and the Coming of the American Revo-
lution, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 335, 344-47 (1976-77) ("[Clustom was law," whereas
"[u]sage was a source of much of the common law.").
CUSTOM AND USAGE
case does not remotely so hold, 10 and because precisely the
opposite conclusion flows from reason and the authorities, the
initial focus of this Article measures the nature of this particular
business, and the traditional uses of custom in general law. This
Article then returns to Marsh v. Gentry and other thoroughbred
cases and typical conflicts, to find a scale of common factors
courts consider and weigh, concluding that custom's role is
varied and powerful.
I. SOMETHING ABOUT THOROUGHBRED HORSES
The first thing to know about the thoroughbred horse busi-
ness is that it has to do with thoroughbred horses. Economic
gain or loss is focused on the speed with which a semi-domes-
ticated animal runs more or less a mile, carrying a man or
woman who weighs barely more than one-hundred pounds."
The first three or four finishers divide the prize money offered
by the racetrack. The economics of the horse business depends
on winning purses. 2 Stallions and mares-valued in the millions
and tens of millions of dollars-have the sole function of pro-
ducing offspring that can win such purses. The value of the
offspring, in turn, is based in part on the probability of their
breeding another generation of winners.
The speed of an animal and its ability to run a distance are
variables not subject to market surveys, not influenced by ad-
vertising and sales techniques, and not obviously subject to
rational analysis.
The money available for purses depends in large part on the
amount of money bet at the racetrack. The racetrack applies a
'o See notes 122-160 infra and accompanying text.
CRIST, THE HORSE TRADERS (1986), is a brilliantly written sportsman's guide to
the exciting world of speed and value, but does not consider business issues.
1 The publications of record in the thoroughbred business are The Blood-Horse
and The Thoroughbred Record, both published in Lexington, Kentucky. Spur is also
worthy of note and is published in Middleburg, Virginia. The Horse Digest, of Leesburg,
Virginia, a more general publication, is also useful. All of these publications are devoted
as much to economics as to sport. Thoroughbred Business, also published in Lexington,
is a new entry, dedicated principally to economic matters. During the years when purses
and yearling prices lost their proper relationship to each other, the effect was observed.
See, e.g., Lawrence, Where is the Yearling Market Headed?, THE THOROUGHBRED
RECORD, July 8, 1981. The Blood-Horse's June 29, 1985, issue contains a good analysis
of the general subject.
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portion of each bet to purses before computing the "odds" in
a particular horse race. These funds, together with owners' entry
fees, modest customer admission fees, various industry supple-
ments, and occasional television revenues and sponsorships, are
returned to the owners of winning horses.' 3
There are people in the horse business-the largest "players"
in some respects-who do not own a racehorse, or whose racing
stables are public relations adjuncts to larger breeding businesses.
These people own mares (females of breeding age or status) and
hold rights to breed to stallions. They are in the business of
selecting successful couplings. A typical breeder will sell the
result of the breeding at auction when the colt (male) or filly
(female) is a yearling-that is, has lived past its first January 1.
The prices obtained for yearlings, insofar as those amounts are
determined by rational decision, are based on the purchaser's
estimate of how fast and far the yearling and its descendants
some day will run. This estimate is made before the colt or filly
has had a saddle on its back-often without the ability to x-ray
the yearling's bones or make any examination of its lungs, the
two most important physical characteristics of a sound thor-
oughbred.' 4 The purchaser's decision can be based only on the
physical appearance of a horse not yet fully grown and on its
parentage-that is, how fast the yearling's parents and ancestors
ran and how many speedy offspring they have produced.
The yearling buyer must make his or her calculation of the
likely race winnings of the animal offered for sale and the
likelihood that winnings can be extended forward into future
generations through the blood of the yearling.' 5 On this basis,
$10,000,000.00 has been invested in a single horse, and
," Some racetracks are not interested in operating at a profit, either because they
are nonprofit institutions that are run for the benefit of the industry, or because their
real profit comes from associated horse sales. The economics of such racetracks would
be different.
" T.W. Miller, At Auction: What are the Buyer's Rights, THOROUGHBRED Busi-
NESS, Nov./Dec., 1985.
"1 The most commonly mentioned example is the difference in syndication price
of AFFIRMED and ALYDAR. The former beat the latter in all three Triple Crown
races, but his lineage suggested that he would be less able to transmit his racing qualities.
The market was correct. AFFIRMED'S share and season values began lower and have
dropped, and ALYDAR'S have increased.
[Vol. 74
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$2,000,000.00 and $3,000,000.00 purchases are so frequent that
they are no longer newsworthy.
It is the purchaser, who usually expects to own the horse
while it is racing, who makes such calculations. His or her
decisions control the breeder's livelihood. The breeder mates
mare with stallion to produce speed and endurance-with an eye
to what matings the buyers will suppose are the most likely to
run fast and far. Some stallions and female bloodlines are more
popular among Europeans and Arabs who race principally in
Europe; some are more popular among Canadian and United
States horsemen. The breeder will produce for the market he or
she anticipates will bring the most money at the regular auction
sales, occurring about two years after conception. With such
calculations in mind, a champion racing mare has been pur-
chased for $7,000,000.00, and fractional interests ("shares") in
stallions (entitling their owners to one breeding each year, and
each representing about a one-fortieth interest in the animal)
bring in excess of $2,000,000.00 on a regular basis.
Fertile mares can be expected to fail to conceive once every
four or five years. Over forty percent of apparently healthy
yearlings are either unfit to run their first race or break down
too early to run to their potential earnings. About three percent
of all registered yearlings win stakes races, and except for a
handful, even the leading sires produce only about ten percent
stakes winners. One can easily understand the incredible, impon-
derable odds that this industry absorbs. Thoroughbred horses
are animals of speed and grace, not intelligence, but it has been
properly noted that they do not bet so extravagantly on humans.
It is not surprising, then, that the horse business did not
develop like other businesses. Because of the industry's focus on
the racing stake, the enforceability of early horse partnership
agreements was questioned. 6 The courts frequently washed their
hands of horsemen, and horsemen, generation after generation,
returned the favor.
The horseman is not only a gambler, but also a deal maker.
Added to the horseman's love of the animal and his or her
1 See, e.g., Morrison v. Bennett, 52 P. 553 (Mont. 1898) (noting some of the
improprieties that accompanied these agreements).
1985-861
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comfort with the unknown, one finds an odd mixture of the
bandit and the saint. The traditional horse deal was made be-
tween people who knew each other, who had dealt with each
other before and who would deal with each other again. It was
negotiated quietly, secretly in the clubhouse or the backstretch,
and it was made in a context of shared expertise and known,
accepted risk. If there was a writing, it was on the back of a
cocktail napkin or a pari-mutuel ticket, or in the margin of the
Daily Racing Form.
Because of the prior and presumed future dealings, and a
shared sense of pride and honor, neither side of a deal clearly
won when it fell through. It is still typical to find among horse-
men the notion that the loser in today's deal will be accorded
some advantage in a future transaction. And it is typical to do
what is "fair," irrespective of legal rights.
Such practices are frequently found in what is known as a
"foal sharing" arrangement. One breeder may own one or two
mares, while another breeder owns a stallion share; the two may
believe that the horses' mating would be successful. The breeders
may make a one-year partnership agreement, sharing the own-
ership and proceeds of the offspring; but often they will make
a two-year deal: the stallion will be bred to the mare or mares,
and the offspring will be divided by the two owners, with one
taking the first offspring, and the other taking the second. The
breeders are not partners; they will not divide the profit of any
particular animal. But they have a continuing relationship, and
face together the risk of the mare's and the stallion's survival
and value until the end of the second breeding season. If the
mare or stallion dies after the first year, what happens? What
often happens is that the parties simply make a new deal, reas-
sembling their risks and probabilities. Apparently, there is no
judicial decision on the subject, and a multiplicity of different
deals occur. The uniqueness of each event and risk would make
it impossible to establish a constant custom-or even a standard
form of contract for the industry. It is a gambler's game, and
the friendly parties "work it out."
A related practice occurs at horse auctions, the method by
which thoroughbred yearlings are almost always bought and
sold. Despite the fact that most yearlings are purchased without
the benefit of an an x-ray or a lung examination, the seller
[Vol. 74
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(inaccurately called "consignor") usually gives no warranty of
fitness in either respect. 17 The auction "conditions of sale"
typically contains the Uniform Commercial Code's provision for
waiving implied warranties of fitness.' 8 Concealing a known
defect would undoubtedly provide a cause of action for actual
fraud,' 9 but the consignor typically also has not made his or her
own examination. The seller, like prospective purchasers, has
made only the examination permitted by observing the horse in
its stall, the barn or a nearby ring, and having seen it run in
the field. A defect in a hoof, or a chip or spur on a bone,
although possibly ending a racing career before it begins, will
be known by neither buyer nor seller. What happens when an
x-ray shows a congenital defect, or an examination shows defec-
tive lungs? In the atmosphere of the clubhouse or the back-
stretch, the buyer and the seller will often reduce the risks,
despite the lack of a legal requirement to do so. In one recent
multi-million dollar transaction, for example, the seller bought
back a large percentage of a yearling with a defective but op-
erable hoof. The practices are so varied, the events so unique,
"1 Horses are the most likely personal property for the exclusion of implied
warranties. Egan v. Call, 34 Pa. 236 (1859) ("Certainly, there is no such engagement in
the sale of such an article as a horse."); Wood v. Ross, Tex., 26 S.W. 148 (1894) ("In
a general sale of a horse the seller only warrants it to be an animal of the description
it appears to be, and nothing more."); Merchants & Mechanics' Say. Bank v. Fraze,
Ind., 36 N.E. 378 (1894) ("If a man sells a horse generally, he warrants no more than
that it is a horse."); Moore v. Miller, 100 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. 1936). See also Annot., 55
A.L.R. 2d 892. In Cohan, The Uniform Commercial Code as Applied to Implied
Warranties and 'Merchantability' and 'Fitness' in the Sale of Horses, 73 Ky. L.J. 665
(1985), the author says: "In circumstances where the seller of a horse cannot be deemed
a merchant for purposes of triggering the U.C.C.'s implied warranty of merchantability,
one should consider whether an alternative cause of action exists for negligent liability
based on the seller's failure to exercise due care." Id. at 673. The author gives no
citation.
" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2)-(3) (1962) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
See notes 105-108 infra and accompanying text.
19 See note 104 infra and accompanying text. See Overhulser v. Peacock, 128 S.W.
526 (Mo., 1910) ("The main point urged here is that, if plaintiff knew the horse had
heaves, he was bound, in every event, to notify defendant of the fact; was, ipso facto,
guilty of a fraud if he did not, regardless of whether the disease was detectable by an
ordinary inspection, or of the price defendant was to pay. In our opinion this proposition
is not the law.") The court also says that "the silence must be attended by circumstances
which render it a fraud," but continues, suggesting that "there must be some agreement
or relationship that makes it a duty of the seller to divulge the defect."
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that no two such deals are alike. Only in an exceptional
circumstance2 could such a practice be considered for its legal
effect.
The negative side of the typical horse transaction-every bit
as fundamental as the honor among horsemen-is the remnant
of the industry's traditional respect for the bandit. "Pulling a
fast one" is as much a characteristic of some "horse traders"
as any other trait. On its face, a public auction appears to be
the best way for a seller to obtain the highest price for his horse,
and for the market to set a true value on thoroughbred blood-
lines. All of the largest breeders, and all of the substantial
purchasers, are represented at the several premier Keeneland
sales in Kentucky and Saratoga sales in New York each year,
and a great many appear at lesser auction sales at those locations
and elsewhere across the country. The problem with this eco-
nomic market theory is that the dealmakers-the horse traders-
are operating in the wings. The industry understands that it
cannot know whether the auction prices reveal the true sales
prices of at least one-half of the animals auctioned.
Usually at the auction sales, the auctioneer will publicly
announce that the conditions of sale allow owners to bid on
their own horses, 2' a practice that otherwise would be unlawful.'2
"By bidding" is used to force up the sales price, beyond what
it might have been if the owner had not bid against the final
bidder. Similarly, a horse placed on the auction block may have
been sold privately before the first bid was made,2 and the
apparent auction price reflects the fact that a rogue bidder has
forced the horse's true owner to keep entering bids, benefitting
only the auction company whose commission is based on the
final bid. A horse trader may also wish to give the appearance
that the offspring of a particular stallion bring high prices at
auction, and he or she may then arrange for two bidders to
make phantom bids against each other. The ultimate price may
not represent a sale at all, but a consciously created apparent
o See text accompanying note 256 infra.
21 U.C.C. § 2-328(4) (1962).
Burdon v. Seitz, 267 S.W. 219 (Ky. 1924).
23 See Chamblin, On Integrity of Sales, THE BLooD-HonsE, March 16, 1935.
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price-to the benefit of the stallion's owners and, incidentally,
the auction company.
The persistence in the thoroughbred horse business of both
honor and banditry24 are more recently coupled with something
new: the appearance of "new money" in the business. Increas-
ingly in recent years, people accumulating large fortunes in other
businesses have entered-for sport, social life, tax shelter and
greed-into a business in which prestige is high and profits are
apparently volatile and great. In addition, and for some of the
same motives, persons of more modest wealth have entered into
the business as purchasers of interests in racing and breeding
syndicates, often in the form of public or semi-public offerings
of limited parterships.2Y Although the industry's old sense of
comradery and status is a goal of many newcomers, the closed-
in community that was the foundation of those traits has been
gradually diluted. Consequently, the expertise with which breed-
ers and race horse owners protected themselves-or accepted
their fate-is dissipated. Similarly, the newcomers to the business
bring with them different standards of honor and different ex-
pectations of the legal effects of what they do.
Another, parallel change in the industry has been its in-
creased openness to information. What had been a closed soci-
ety, jealous of its secrecy, has become in some part an open
market. Typical of this change is the advent of the Matchmaker
Breeders Exchange and the subsequent development of Stallion
Access, two companies that provide computer-accessed markets.
These companies allow breeders to buy and sell fractional inter-
ests in stallions ("shares"), and annual breeding rights ("sea-
sons'"), by making and accepting open offers to buy and sell-
on and from continually changing, highly visible and published
lists of price quotations. Both markets restrict their membership
to individuals having experience in the thoroughbred horse busi-
ness, and both require that all purchases be made for the purpose
14 Of course the author is not suggesting actual illegal behavior; the word "bandit"
is used in this Article solely metaphorically. In the course of discussing with horsemen
the facts of Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975), see note 139 infra, there was
general agreement as to the custom described and a frequent admiration for the successful
trickery involved.
I' See Heckerman, Taking Stock of Shares, THE BLOOD-HoRSE, January 14, 1984.
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of breeding, and not for resale. Thus they studiously avoid the
essential features of a commodities market 26 and avoid bringing
to the business some of the characteristics of securities.27 These
markets also prohibit the market manipulation practices em-
ployed at horse auctions. They bring a new character to the
business; some fundamental transactions are done openly, for
everyone to see. That is a revolution indeed.
And so the business is faced with the challenge of newcomers
and new techniques. What this Article takes to be persistent
practices, subject to rational analysis and application, remain.
The customs discussed below are based, it is believed, on the
peculiar nature of this business-its sense and appreciation of
the gamble, its love of the animal and the sport, its odd mixture
of honor and trickery, and the persistent proximity of its prac-
titioners. Is there some way to capture those qualities in the
law?
II. SOMETHING ABOUT THE HISTORIC ROLE OF CUSTOM
There is no need for a systematic attempt to trace the history
of custom in the law.2s It is not without some interest, however-
if of limited relevance-to note that Aristotle, customs' most
impressive advocate as a source of law, 29 held that first among
the most "useful parts of wealthgetting" was the ability to know
"what sort of horses ... are most likely to give a return." 30
See CFTC v. Co Petro Marketing Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1932)
(commodities firm that acted as agent for customers buying and selling gasoline futures
contract was a "board of trade"); In re Stovall, Cormm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) q 20,941
(CFTC 1979). See also CFTC Interpretive Letter No. 77-12 (Aug. 17, 1977); Comm.
FUT. L. REP. (CCH) q 20,467.
27 See note 5 supra.
I For a general discussion of the history of custom in the law, see C. ALLEN,
supra note 9; Bermon, The Background of the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw
of the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 553 (1978); Furnish, Custom as a Source
of Law, 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 31 (Supp. 1982); J. GRAY, THm NATURE AND SotrcEs oF
THE LAW (2d ed. 1921); Reid, supra note 9.
29 "ITlhe law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which
can only be given by time." PoLIcs Book 2, Chapter 9, q ViII (P. Jouett trans. 1957).
"[C]ustomary laws have more weight, and relate to more important matters, than written
laws, and a man may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer than the
customary law." Id., Book 2, Chapter 9, q IX.
10 Id., Book 1, Chapter 11, q XI.
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Most of what should be said in this Article is negative, a list
of traditional and rhetorical concerns that need not remain a
burden. There flows from them a more limited ambition than
most discussions of the subject, and a broader, more relaxed
view of the relationship of several factors that seem consistently
to be involved in particular cases. An application of such an
approach to this one interesting business will, it is here assumed,
be generally applicable in the law.
First, one must acknowledge that the word custom means
many things.3 For the most part, it seems wise to avoid "the
confusions caused by overprecise definitions, ' 32 and to let the
context of each issue speak for itself. Such an approach is
required; it is not always possible to conceive "objectively de-
terminable" standards or theories. 33
This analysis also studiously avoids the most common theo-
retical debate dominating all of the secondary sources cited here:
What is the priority in history and legal theory between custom
and judicial pronouncement? Which came first, and which should
control the other?3 4 This Article simply makes the practical
assumption that all practicing lawyers make: The appropriate
task is to offer a reasonable suggestion to a court of proper
jurisdiction.35
Although this analysis identifies what are believed to be a
limited number of factors to be taken into account in judging
the applicability of customs in various contexts, and although
this Article also frequently suggests a method of balancing those
factors, it does not purport to identify the sources of jurisdic-
tional decisionmaking. The entire current debate 6 on how judges
" See B. LEISER, CUSTOM, LAW AND MORALITY 10-38 (1969).
I d. at 8.
" See D'Amato, Wanted: A Comprehensive Theory of Custom in International
Law, 4 TEx. INT'L L.F. 28 (1968) (presenting a framework for a "theory of custom" in
international law).
" See, e.g., J. GRAY, supra note 28, at 297; Furnish, supra note 28, at 31; Reid,
supra note 9, at 344-58.
" Both John Adams and Alex De Tocqueville saw that the adoption of custom
made it inevitable that courts would be the final arbiters of the law of the land. See A.
DE TOCQtEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 72 (R. Heffner ed. 1956); 1 V. PARRINGTON,
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 315 (1927).
See, e.g., Easterbrook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L.
1985-86]
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make and should make their decisions, including the structure
of proper judicial analysis, is here intentionally avoided.
While this Article suggests a substantial role for custom
and usage in an exciting arena, it does not adopt the ration-
ale that there is something morally superior about custom-
made law when compared to court-made law.37 In particular,
this Article does not reflect the notion38 that "fairness, reg-
ularity, and principle" are matters that are "fostered by cus-
tom,'" 39 whereas "elitist" judicial arguments based on public
policy have the "baleful effect" of taking control of human
life away from "the people themselves.'' 4 The problem with
such a view-imposed by reality itself-is that custom can be
every bit as unfair, irregular and unprincipled as judicial flat.
Courts can be accused of "amending" statutes4' and the con-
stitution,42 and of illogic and loose thinking,43 when they act
on the basis of their views of policy. They may be guilty of
the same errors, however, if they seek and apply custom.44
REv. 622 (1985); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?,
98 HA v. L. REv. 592 (1985). Although discussed in a slightly different context, the
application of custom could be rationalized under a radically new theory: "Its apparent
justification lies in the attempt to defend private community against the disruptive
intervention of the law and of the regime of rigidly defined rights and duties that the
law would bring in its wake." Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 563, 621 (1983).
1 Though custom is often "vague, confused, and impractical," it also can be
"creative, sublime, and suited to human needs." See F. KERN, KINGsHIP AND LAW IN
THE MEDICAL AOFs 179 (1939).
11 Fernandez, Custom and the Common law: Judicial Restraint and Lawmakings
by Courts, 11 Sw. L. REv. 1237 (1979).
11 Id. at 1238 (citing G. KEETON, ENGLISH LAW; THE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION 40-
145 (1974) and T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CohstsON LAW 157-59 (5th
ed. 1956)).
o Fernandez, supra note 38, at 1239.
Id. at 1244-52.
Id. at 1252-54.
Id. at 1262-64.
Thus, one can accuse the United States Supreme Court of creating bad law
when it held in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) that "the spoils system interferes
with the freedom of political association." Id. at 357. See also Fernandez, supra note
38, at 1261-62. A court can also depart from logic and achieve unfortunate results,
however, when it relies affirmatively on the spoils system as giving color of law to the
act of its practitioners-because "it has been sanctioned by practice and usage and
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A custom is neither good nor bad for its longevity.4 5
There is no overwhelming evidence that courts have adopted
the populist approach. 4 With Professor Bermon, it seems fair
to suggest that "the professionalization and systemization of
law" has made it impossible to broaden (or often to preserve)
the scope "left for people's attitudes and beliefs, and for their
unconscious ideas, their processes of mythical thought. '47
That is not to say that the populist-elitist controversy is not
an important and historic one, even though today it cloaks itself
in a generalized hostility toward courts and lawyers. Depending
on how seriously one takes the content of public argumentation
(as opposed to underlying economic and social realities), it can
be said that the same debate lay at the core of the American
Revolution. 48 Along with those who championed "natural rights,"
specifically found to be a fact of political life in municipal governments." Wisconsin v.
Tronca, 267 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Wis. 1978).
In Tronca, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it was a part of an alderman's
official duty to dispense patronage, so he could be found guilty of bribery when he
accepted money to influence the disbursal of patronage. See id. at 221-26. That is
something quite different from following a statutory mandate that directs attention to
the "customs and usages" and "force of law" discriminations that are enjoined by
Congress. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
" But see note 178 infra and accompanying text.
46 See Fernandez, supra note 38, at 1285-87. Judge Fernandez compares an Iowa
case, Kimple v. Schafer, 143 N.W. 505 (Iowa 1913)(a decision that he agrees with), to
a California case, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (1975) (a decision that he does
not agree with).
In Iowa, the ancient, court-approved custom of allowing chicken farmers to permit
their chickens to run at large was overturned by a recent decision. Judge Fernandez
praised the Iowa court, which noted that chicken farmers for the most part no longer
follow this ancient custom. He criticized the California court for giving only lip service
to the changing custom when it followed the lead of juries in rejecting the rigid
contributory negligence defense. Id. at 1288-89. The problem is that the Iowa Court also
made its decision, according to its opinion, in part because of the general public interest
in high speed automobile travel. In both Iowa and California, then, there was a
convergence of public interest with popular practice. It is usually the case that "custom,
policy and law unite" in horse cases as elsewhere. Thompson v. Miser, 92 N.W. 420,
421 (Ohio, 1910). Judge Fernandez is left with preferring that a court emphasize the
practice over the interest. He has not offered an example in which the two conflict.
A horse case in which custom was unsuccessfully argued to create so clear an
expectation that the statute could not constitutionally supersede it is Horsemen's Benev.
v. Division of Pari-Mutuel, 397 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1981) (The statute, requiring a 1%
purse pool payment, was overturned on other constitutional grounds.).
" Bermon, supra note 28, at 588.
"' This Article deals with the views of the lawyers who were in the American
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and sometimes from the same voices, colonial lawyer-revolution-
aries argued that the Stamp Act and other intrusions of Parlia-
ment and the Crown were unconstitutional under the written
British Constitution-a product (they argued) of the customary
relations between the subjects and the sovereign. 49 Such views
reflected the notion commonly held among seventeenth century
English lawyers, and eighteenth century American lawyers, that
custom and law are identical. 50 John Adams said, "Judicial
decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence that
can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a
part of the common law.' '5 That view was fully in accord with
Blackstone, who held that custom and law are the same.52
Such a view could not be maintained in a fluid and complex
society, and certainly it does not fit the horse industry that this
Article has described and will pursue. Evidence is found later in
this Article: The difficulty of proving usage, changes in industry
and common custom, and the conflicts of interest among dif-
ferent segments of society and business, conspire to make so
pure a view impractical in real life. The ambivalence nonetheless
is reflected as late as the first RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS.
Section 249 recognized the modern rule that "[u]sage cannot
change a rule of law, ' '5 3 but the comment to that section sup-
posed that "[l]ong continued usage may develop a rule of law
in accordance with the usage. ' 5 4
A more logically balanced view, and a fair starting point
from which to view the horse cases and thoroughbred hypothet-
Revolution. See notes 49-52 infra and accompanying text. Those views also were reflected
by the non-lawyers, led by Samuel Adams. Adams would have expressed "a commitment
of America to the familiar ways of his ancestors." P. MAIER, THE OLD REVoLuTiONARIES:
POLITICAL Limas IN THE AGE OF SAWs-EL ADAmS 272 (1980). Vernon Parrington charac-
teristically says that "Adams was probably fully aware of the weakness of the argument."
1 V. PARR1NGTON, supra note 35, at 244. See also note 164 infra.
19 Reid, supra note 9, at 336-37.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 346 (quoting J. Adams, [From the Boston Gazette, 1 February 1773],
reprinted in 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAAs 540-41 (1851)). Parrington calls John Adams the
"pioneer" of this "narrow field," and suggests that the view is only of "historical
interest." 1 V. PARRINGTON, supra note 35, at 315. See also note 164 infra.
See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72-79 (1765).
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 249 (1932).
' d. at § 249 comment a. "Do I contradict myself?/Very well then I contradict
myself." WALT WHTrMAN, Song of Myself, LEAVES OF GRASS 101 (1940).
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icals, is found in Professor Furnish's 1982 article," which in
turn draws on the earlier sources. The inception of the English
common law was heavily dependent on custom, but "it occupies
a vestigial position today." 5 6 Custom and usage will affect the
outcome of a judicial decision if and only if some other source
of law-the constitution, the legislature, or a judicially-adopted
principle directs an examination of custom and usage.5 7 That is
not to say that the role is small, but "custom" has lost its battle
with "public policy," and the law can get on with the more
instructive process of finding those areas in which public policy
is best served by the adoption of custom. 5 8
III. TRADE USAGE AND MODERN LAW
The basic observation here is that when custom guides ju-
dicial decisions, it does so with the support of generally appli-
cable policy. One policy is the inherent value of diversity. There
are those who say that this is America's central quality.5 9 This
" See Furnish, supra note 28.
" Id. at 31. Professor Furnish's evidence for even that vestigial role is thin:
Customs are adopted by the court in contexts that appear to be obscure, free of conflict
among important elements of the society, and innocent of obvious public policy reso-
lutions. When customs are adopted, they carry with them the nontraditional test of
demonstrable "reasonableness," a matter discussed in this Article. See infra notes 78-
270 and accompanying text. The reasonableness test imports into the area claimed by
custom a trojan horse carrying with it any public policy consideration a court chooses
to impose.
"7 Furnish, supra note 28, at 32.
5s The terms "policy" or even "public policy", and "reasonable", as used in this
Article, have the same general meaning, each suggesting an approach to judicial decision
making based on values. This Article does not rigorously distinguish the differences. See
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REv. 949 (1985) (focus of American
common law system should be on "right," as in other legal systems, rather than on
"reasonableness").
5 "I hear America singing, the varied carols I heard,/Those of mechanics ...
The carpenter ... The mason ... The boatman ... The shoemaker ... The wood-
cutter ... /Each singing with open mouths their strong melodious songs." WALT
VsjmAN, I Hear America Singing, LEAvEs OF GRASS 16 (1940). Parrington suggests
that "diversity may prove to be symptomatic of the hurrying changes that the rise of
the middle class was bringing to America." 2 V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN
AmERIcAN THOUGHT 175 (1927). See note 164 infra. Even John Stuart Mill, the great
enemy of custom, argues that the diverse practices of interacting communities can
approximate the value of the individuality he advocates. See, e.g., J. MILL, THREE
ESSAYS 83, 89 (1975).
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Article more modestly claims that diversity is a legitimate public
policy, to be given effect if not counter-balanced by more im-
portant policies. Again, in the negative: Who cares how messy
the child leaves his own room?
Usages of particular trades have been the stepchildren of
custom and usage generally. The fight of centuries ago was
between custom and the sovereign. Today, America grants as-
cendancy to the sovereign, and is free to recognize that the
"imperfect communities" that operate beneath the umbrella of
the greater community have a role to play in their own gover-
nance. 60 First we must admit that a particular trade sets its own
rules only with the sufferance of the rest of society, and then a
court can consider the scope of self-regulation without a com-
pulsive need to find and compare "conflicts with the rule of
law." 61
The most intriguing aspect of the modern law of custom and
usage is the effort of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
(hereinafter referred to as Restatement) and of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to make a reasoned return to the
roots of our common law system and to encourage the creation
of various bodies of law fitted to particular trades. Somehow,
maritime contracts divided themselves from ordinary common
law principles and created implied agreements peculiar to their
own industry. 62 Will thoroughbred horses carve out the same
sort of niche? Sailors and pirates are no more colorful than
breeders and horse traders.
The U.C.C. and the Restatement have removed the two
highest barriers to the development of individualized bodies of
law. They have removed the "universality" 63 requirement of
traditional common law customs and have made their own judg-
ment as to the importance of a major public policy.
The Restatement dispenses with the "universality" require-
ment by demanding only so much "regularity" as will "justify
See B. LEISER, supra note 31, at 65-70; note 36 supra.
See C. ALLEN, supra note 9, at 135.
- See, e.g., Booth Steamship Co. v. Neier & Oelhaf Co., 262 F.2d 310, 312-13
(2d Cir. 1958).
11 For a discussion of the universality requirement, see notes 124-135 infra and
accompanying text.
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an expectation" on the part of the party claiming the usage that
will be observed in the particular transaction. 64 Once that regu-
larity is established, the parties not only have given meaning to
their contract, but also have created circumstances in which the
usage will supplement or even qualify their agreement. 65 That
radical policy determination should be made clear: A supplement
is a term supplied to a contract that the parties did not explicitly
discuss and that may be in conflict with an otherwise declared
public policy. 6 The supplement might even be held to create a
contract when otherwise a contract might not have been found. 67
No longer must courts look for "latent and patent" ambigui-
ties, 6S nor "indefinite" provisions to make definite. 69 Further-
more, the qualification of a contract can alter the otherwise
plain language of an agreement.7 0
The U.C.C. commissioners, intending to adopt those dra-
matic results, included the exact language of the Restatement in
sections 1-205(2) and (4) of the U.C.C.71 The courts are in sharp
conflict as to just how far they will allow these radical changes
to go. Courts have given consideration, for example, to whether
an absolute prohibition on the sale of mortgaged property by a
dealer will be overcome by a usage and/or a course of dealing
and/or performance that recognizes his or her customary sales.72
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1979).
" Id. at § 222(3).
See Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc. v. B. & R. Textile Corp., 464 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-
64 (App. Div. 1983) (Sandier, J., concurring) (citing Schubtex, Inc. v. Allen Snyder,
Inc., 399 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1979) (agreement to arbitrate, supplementing the express
terms of a contract, may be implied from course of past conduct or from custom and
practice in the industry)).
' See Freeman v. First State Bank of Albertville, 401 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. 1981).
'- See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Robert W. Hunt Co., 296 S.E.2d 633, 635
(Ga. Ct. App. 1982).
" See, e.g., Crossland v. Kentucky Blue Grass Seed Growers' Co-Op Ass'n., 103
F.2d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 1939).
-0 See Gholson, Byars and Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d
987, 999-1000 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
" For a detailed discussion of usage of trade and course of performance in the
Uniform Commercial Code, see J. WHITE & R. SumlmERs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER rHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-3 (2d ed. 1980). Miron v. Yonkers Raceway,
400 F.2d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1968), a racehorse case, recognized the U.C.C.'s "more
liberal" standard.
I Id. at §§ 3-3, 25-12, 25-13. See also R. ANDERSON, 4 ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306:18 (2d ed. 1971).
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There certainly is room for judicial maneuvering within the
framework of the factors reflected by the earlier cases. 73 What-
ever the legitimate range of disagreement and discretion, courts
failing to see that the U.C.C. has created contracts and contract
terms where they did not exist before are simply in error and
should be overruled.74
It is useful to rationalize and systematize the range of dis-
cretion exercised by courts that must apply custom to a trans-
action before them-whether or not the U.C.C is applicable,
and whether or not there is a contract in whose interpretation
or application the Restatement would be of interest. Generally,
a usage of a trade is applied (or not applied) depending upon
various policy factors, which may point in different directions.75
Each type of transaction is examined on the basis of the com-
peting policies that might be relevant.
IV. THE RECURRING QUESTION OF "CONSENT"
The hook upon which custom often hangs its hat is the
language of a statute or judicial declaration that allows a form
of behavior with (and only with) the "consent" of another
party,76 or with (and only with) the grant of "authority' 77 to
act. In accordance with the general framework of this Article,
a commonly accepted policy is to permit behavior that otherwise
would be improper, when the person affected by the improper
behavior gives his or her permission.
Frequently, the facts present the largest problem. The person
who would benefit from the applicaton of a general rule (and
7' See notes 162-171 infra and accompanying text. For this Article's proposal for
the framework, see notes 171, 180 infra and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Martin v. Ben P. Eubank Lumber Co., 395 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1965).
In Martin the Court held, "Certainly, 'course of dealing between parties' and 'any usage
of trade' may be competent to explain any ambiguities in a contract; this does not mean
that a course of dealing or trade usage may be used to make a contract between parties."
Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
7 "Always a knit of identity, always distinction, always a breed of life." WALT
WHITMAN, supra note 54, at 36.
76 See, e.g., W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 10 (5th
ed. 1984); West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral
and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Michael Posner, 99 HARv. L. REv. 384 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (1979).
" See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
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thus the one who has the right to waive it) does not give his or
her explicit consent, but nonetheless knows and implicitly agrees
to the exceptional behavior. Is he or she just as much bound as
if there were a sealed document granting permission for the
exceptional behavior to occur?
A further central question arises at the level of proof. The
person who can change the rules by his acquiescence may say
that he or she really did not know of or agree to the other
party's behavior. Can knowledge and acquiescence be found as
a matter of practical reality merely because the pattern of be-
havior is so customary and predictable that the person benefited
by the rule must have known that the behavior would occur?
Can the known custom, then, take the place of actual knowl-
edge?
A. The Insertion of Policy
There are some cases in which a court would reject such a
suggestion out of hand. If, for example, it were suggested that
customarily lawyers forge another's name to fraudulent docu-
ments, the court would not be the slightest bit interested in
giving effect to the custom. 78 That would be the clearest case of
a blatantly unreasonable custom-that is, one that conflicts with
a major public policy-and no court would give it effect. Society
has such a serious stake in the honor of the Bar that this usage
would be ignored and condemned.
The result may or may not properly be the same when a
statute creates a crime for the use of property or services "with-
out authority," and it is demonstrated that there is a well-
understood custom among superior employees of using the serv-
ices of inferior employees for their personal, individual benefit.
In such a case, the Sixth Circuit held that the custom could not
prevail, as it would be in "violation of the criminal code." ' 79
This analysis is entirely circular. If authority can be given by
" See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hammond, 619 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Ky. 1981)
("Respondent's attempt to justify [the forging of a physician's name to fraudulent
medical records for workers' compensation claims] by asserting that his conduct is
customary among attorneys ... falls flat on its face.").
Burnett v. United States, 222 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1955).
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custom, then the pursuit of the custom does not violate the
statute. The following would be a correct form of.-reasoning:
Such use of employees may be so immoral and unreasonable
that it cannot be proved. The court would focus on the true
policy issue before it. Should society make allowance for such
a source of unexpressed authority? Should the courts protect
shareholders or taxpayers as it protects clients?
Two cases, one from New York 0 and one from Florida,8'
provide an extraordinary example of this policy analysis. Each
case involved the well-known custom of a newspaper reporter's
intrusion into the privacy of private homes. Does that custom
replace the actual consent of an individual to a trespass? The
New York court had no difficulty with holding that no such
custom will be allowed. 82 The Florida court strained and strug-
gled with the competing policies, and ended with the same re-
sult,83 a result that it reached with considerably more ease when
the intruder was a mere creditor with a right to repossess mort-
gaged personal property. 84 The degree of unreasonability of the
custom plainly was affected by the public policy that the court
perceived as supporting the challenged behavior. First amend-
ment-type policies created a greater counterweight than property-
type policies. There is no escape from the fact that courts must
make such judgments.
B. Reasonability as a Tort-like Concept
Examples from the area of tort law have been used, thus
far, to illustrate a proper approach to consent which is princi-
10 Anderson v. WROC-TV, WHEC-TV, WOKR-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1981).
,1 Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., (Cir. Ct. Duval County) (unreported trial
court decision granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the issue of
trespass), rev'd, Fletcher v. Florida Publishing Co., 319 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment on issue of trespass), rev'd,
Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976) (reversing District Court
of Appeals holding that no recovery could be had on trespass claim because of implied
consent from custom and usage authorizing entry), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
81 See 441 N.Y.S.2d at 223, in which the court emphatically stated, "The gathering
of news and the means by which it is obtained does not authorize, whether under the
First Amendment or otherwise, the right to enter into a private home by an implied
invitation arising out of a self-created custom and practice."
See 319 So. 2d at 104-09.
See Quest v. Barnett Bank of Pensacola, 397 So. 2d 1020, 1023-24 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
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pally a contract question. The same relationship is found be-
tween tort and contract matters by an examination of more
traditional tort concerns. The ordinary use of custom in tort law
does not involve issues of consent. Rather, a custom is examined
to determine whether an actor has acted reasonably (as opposed
to negligently) in the circumstances."5 In such cases, "the cus-
toms of the community, or of others under like circumstances,"
are taken into account when a "reasonable man" would follow
them.16 The test as to uniformity is somewhat different in ap-
plying a common tort analysis, as is later noted . 7 Pure tort
questions may be treated differently as customs change. 81 The
tests are different, however, not because one question is raised
by tort and another by contract, but because the court is seeking
advice on a different subject. In the contract cases, the court is
trying to determine whether an actor knew a practice well enough
that one can assume he made a judgment with respect to it. In
the tort cases, the court is directly seeking the community's
judgment as to the reasonability of the actor's behavior. This
Article does not involve many tort questions, but it is centrally
necessary to distinguish between those factors that honestly re-
flect on the intent of the parties, and those that reflect only
society's values. In tort questions, only the latter factors would
be involved.
The tort judgment can, however, be required in a contract
situation as well. There is such a case in the thoroughbred horse
business, wherein one of the parties was also a party to Marsh
v. Gentry. 9 Thus, in the case of Schleicher v. Gentry90 (herein-
s, "If the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a
possible inference that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable
conduct; and if he does not do what others do, there is a possible inference that he is
not so conforming." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 295A comment b (1965).
1 Id. A horse case in which the customary standard for the care of horses was
used offensively is Matherne v. Terrebonne Parish Police, 462 So. 2d 274 (La. Ct. App.
1984). A horse case in which the customary standard of care of horses was unsuccessfully
so used is Forsyth v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 152 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
" See notes 134-135 infra and accompanying text.
Thus, "state of the art" standards may be mixed with "customary practice"
standards. See Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170, 1175 (6th Cir. 1977). Or state of the
art may supersede customary practice. See Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25
(Neb. 1979). In the latter analysis, the tort question becomes a more complex policy
matter, very much like the tort-type contract questions raised here.
' 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982). See also notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text.
554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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after referred to as Gentry 1) the seller of a thoroughbred mare
(Schleicher) had mixed up two horses, and had sold and delivered
to the buyer (Gentry) a mare less valuable than the one whose
pedigree was listed in the sales catalog.9 1 The sale occurred at
auction in the fall of 1974, and Schleicher apparently contended
that Gentry's delay in discovering the error foreclosed recovery:
It was not until August of 1975 that Mr. Gentry checked the
identification in his mare's mouth in order to have the papers
properly prepared for the Jockey Club for the mares and foal.
It was established that it was the common and accepted prac-
tice in the industry to make these checks in August.9
The Gentry I court passed onto other defenses, eventually
holding that Gentry could not recover his asserted lost profits
on the transaction because of their uncertainty. 93 Nonetheless, it
is useful to note that the Kentucky Court of Appeals used a
"common and accepted" practice to test a matter roughly like
contributory negligence-but in the area of contract law. Gentry
I illustrates the interdependence of tort analysis with the contract
cases, because the specific question before the court would have
been whether Gentry had waited an unreasonable time to make
his discovery and assert his complaint (a tort question), in the
context of asking whether he had waived his rights94 or perhaps
accepted the wrong horse95-both of which indicate the intention
to form or alter a contract.9 That precise analysis was made
under the U.C.C. in another horse case by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, 97 in which one discovers that horsemen
91 The difference in value between the two mares was reflected by the great
disparity in the sales prices of the two mares. The mare that was represented as the less
valuable mare was sold at the Keeneland sales in the fall of 1974 for $2,700.00, while
the mare represented as the more valuable of the two was purchased by Mr. Gentry at
the Keeneland sales in January, 1975, for $50,000.00. Id. at 885.
92 Id.
9 Id. at 886.
- See, e.g., Taylor v. Eblinger Shoe Mfg. Co., 257 S.W. 7, 8 (Ky. 1923) (buyer's
duty to notify seller of defective goods).
91 See, e.g., Cogan v. Wall, 266 S.W. 884, 884-85 (Ky. 1924) (right of rejection
must be exercized within a reasonable time after acceptance).
' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 comment b (1981).
' Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1968).
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examine their potential race horses more quickly than they ex-
amine their breeding stock.98
C. Warranties and Fraud, Waiver of Warranties, and
Standards of Care
When a horseman states that a mare is "barren" he is saying
that she has not conceived a foal. 99 If in fact she had conceived,
but lost her foal before its birth, the correct term would be
"slipped."'10 The difference may tell a prospective purchaser
something about the mare's qualities as a future investment.,'
The correct usage was common enough in the early 1980's to
sustain a claim of breach of warranty for the mislabeling of the
mare at an auction sale. 02 The one reported case, and other
unreported cases, have occasioned auction companies explicitly
to require that distinction to be made by those who list mares
for sale. 0a And so, in the mid-1980's, the custom has become
so universal that it can support a judgment for fraud and pu-
nitive damages for the failure to abide by it. I' 4
This would seem to be a compelling example of a contract
matter that blends into tort, and one that neatly illustrates the
positive interaction of custom and law.
[lI]t is customary, when buying a racehorse, to have a veterinarian or
trainer examine the horse's legs, and we agree that the existence of this
custom is very important in determining whether there was a reasonable
opportunity to inspect the horse.. . . We gather from the record that the
reason it is customary to examine a racehorse's legs at the time of sale is
that a splint bone is rather easily fractured.
Id. at 118 (emphasis added). A similar practice is discussed in Grandi v. LeSage, 399
P.2d 285 (N.M. 1965), in which a horse, represented as a possible stud, was claimed
and was later discovered to be a gelding. The same fact pattern in a U.C.C. context is
considered in the New York case of White Devon Farms v. Stall, 20 U.C.C. Rep. 291
(1976).
'" See J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, SUCCESSFUL THOROUGHBRED INVESTMENT IN
A CHANGING MARKET 84 (1984).
" Id.
"i' Id.
" See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1381-82 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
" See J. LOHUAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 84.
- See Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App.,
1986).
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Another such illustration grows out of the universal custom
at thoroughbred auctions for the "conditions of sale" to exclude
all implied warranties. Although the enforceability of exculpa-
tory clauses is a complex body of law on its own, the applica-
bility of custom is particularly interesting in this context. Some
cases hold that the fact that all similar sellers disclaim warranties
tends to make disclaimers more reasonable. 05 Some courts make
the more reasonable assumption that such generality (especially
in an oligopolistic industry like the thoroughbred auction busi-
ness) is evidence that the purchasers are not in a position to
purchase fairly.' °6 The former principle is usually applied in
animal cases, 07 but the particular current needs of this business
may require that a court recognize that such disclaimers are
"pregnant with evil," or demand the recognition of a "public
policy" against enforceability.'03
Similarly, tort and contract rules are substantially inter-
changeable by a court considering the implied duties of a paid
bailee of horses. A set of California decisions'09 is illustrative,
and is cumulated by a recent case" 0 which explicitly recognized
and weighed the changing needs of the business, balancing the
interests of the parties and the industry.
D. Custom Adopted by Contracts and Customary Contracts
One further, closely related convergence of the tort-contract
interplay is found in connection with another common practice
in the thoroughbred horse business. It is usual in contracts
,01 Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
'- Durham v. CIBA-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982).
'1 Kincheloe v. Geldmeier, 619 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. 1981); Torstenson v. Melcher,
241 N.W.2d 103 (Neb. 1976); Sessa v. Reigle, 427 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
,01 See the case distinguished in the thoroughbred case of Rutter v. Arlington Park
Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065 (7th Cir. 1975). By way of stark contrast, however, compare
Belmont's Ex'r v. Talbot, 51 S.W. 588 (Ky. 1899) ("There being no custom to warrant
at this public sale, it may be that a warranty by the auctioneer would not bind Mr.
Belmont.") Professors White and Summers described this correctly as "no-worse-than-
anybody-else ethics'." WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNrIFOsl COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-7, at p.
353 (2d ed. 1980).
- Vaughan v. Bixby, 142 P. 100 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1914); Williams v. Dougan,
223 P.2d 631 (Cal. App. 1950).
110 Gebert v. Yank, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. App. 1985).
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providing for the syndication of thoroughbred stallions to limit
the liability of the syndicate manager and/or farm operator to
the standard of those who manage stallions, sometimes in the
locality where the stallion stands."' Such a provision allows a
practical limitation on the proof that would be necessary in a
trial. Thus, the parties to a contract adopt a trade usage from
a locality in explicit terms-just as legislatures sometimes do." 2
Such an agreement is undoubtedly enforceable, ' 3 unless it goes
so far as to allow willful behavior to go unpunished, or to
relieve from liability an offender of some special public policy." 4
Such a case, however, is to be distinguished from the accus-
tomed adoption by an industry of unlawful behavior. Thus, it
is also common in the syndication of thoroughbred stallions to
prohibit the sale of fractional interests at public auctions.' ' This
practice is a part of the traditional secrecy and self-control of
the business, and it conflicts directly with the practice of both
the Matchmaker Breeders Exchange and Stallion Access to auc-
tion stallion shares, since these companies conduct open auctions
- The only book-length study that is of any value in the law relating to horses is
J. HUMPHREYS, RACING LAW (1963). Humphreys attaches the NASHUA Syndication
Agreement as an appendix. See id. at appendix. That classic syndication has been carried
forward in many respects to all modern syndicate agreements.
"I See, e.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172-73 (1977);
Castanho v. Jackson Marine Corp., 650 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1981). New York Tel.
Co. and Castonho interpret 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651 (West 1966), which states in pertinent
part: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." Id. (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 140 F.2d 898,
899 (6th Cir. 1944) (allowing a common carrier to contract against its ordinary negli-
gence); Hagen v. Parker, 175 N.W.2d 483, 486-87 (Wis. 1970) (allowing express agree-
ment limiting agent's liability).
'" The balance between the freedom to contract and the public policy will be made
by the courts. See, e.g., Cobb v. Gulf Ref. Co., 145 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Ky. 1940) (contract
provision that exempted lessor oil company from liability for damages caused to lessee
by gasoline leakage from lessor-installed tanks was not against public policy).
"I This Article makes many firm statements about the customs in the thoroughbred
horse business. There seemed no way to write about the subject without being concrete.
Although the usages described are based on numerous interviews with many participants
at all levels of the business, whose identities it seems an act of friendship to protect, the
inevitable errors are those of the author. Courts will require expert testimony under
oath.
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whose results are made known to the public." 6 The industry
understands that the value of the fractional interests may de-
crease if a stallion progeny fails to win purses, and that even
private sales may reflect reduced values. But so long as the
general market is not informed of a price decline, the continuing
owners will have (for a time at least) control of the market price,
often set and advertised by the farm at which the stallion stands.
The sole motive of prohibiting public sales, then, is price
maintenance' '7-an anti-competitive and presumably unlawful
motive." 8 The unlawful ancillary provision does not affect the
syndicate agreement, but is unenforceable." 9 Such a situation
involves no different issues than the case of the absconding
lawyer or the intruding newspaperman considered earlier. 20
E. Summary
Four related areas of concern, each important in the thor-
oughbred horse business, have been shown to involve a relation-
116 For a discussion of Matchmakers Breeders Exchange and Stallion Access, see
text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
"7 It is sometimes rationalized that the provision helps assure that high quality
mares will be bred to the stallion. To the extent that mares with good records and
bloodlines are bred to a stallion, his offspring have better odds of being runners, and
his own value will be increased. After all, each offspring has two parents. And in a
private sale the seller knows what sort of mares the buyer owns. The argument, however,
rests on the highly doubtful assumption that the seller-who is now no longer interested
in the stallion-cares about the stallion's future. Even if true, the rationalization returns
us to the beginning point: The purpose of prohibiting auction sales is price maintenance.
In any case, the rationalization is nothing more than that. If the quality of the mares
were the issue, there would be (and there sometimes is) some provision for controlling
the quality of mares, irrespective of the existence of private and public sales; even the
original owners of fractional interests can otherwise breed whatever mare they choose.
Syndicate members also have some control of who will buy a share (without affecting
prices) by virtue of the nearly universal syndicate provision that existing syndicate
members have a first refusal right to purchase fractional interests on the terms of any
proposed sale, public or private. The exercise of that right does not hide the public sales
price, but would give the buyer the absolute power to choose the mares for breeding to
the stallion. A Kentucky court correctly analyzed a practice in the tobacco industry in
Germann v. Stanley, 190 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1945).
119 See United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940). Container Corp., Masonite Corp., and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. suggest
that any agreement, the purpose of which is to affect the price, is per se illegal.
19 See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959).
120 See notes 78-84 supra and accompanying text.
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ship between the law and a customary practice in the business.
A fair restatement of that relationship is that custom can be
used to identify what would be reasonable behavior and/or what
might have been the subjective intent of the parties to the
transaction. When no other recognized policy is suggested to
limit the effect of that judgment, or that suggestion of intention,
the special business environment can be allowed to direct the
result of a lawsuit.' 2'
V. Two CENTRAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE LEADING CASE
Before leaping from these underlying principles to a general
formulation of the use of custom and usage in the thoroughbred
horse business, it seems appropriate to start with what is consid-
ered the leading custom case. In Marsh v. Gentry22 (Gentry II),
a managing partner (Gentry) purchased two partnership assets
without the required consent'2 of the inactive partner (Marsh).
Gentry II can be used to illustrate two appropriate applications
of the standards applied to usages by the courts. One standard
concerns the "reasonability" of the alleged custom, and the
other standard concerns the custom's required "universality."
A. The Role of Universality in Gentry II
An independent requirement frequently asserted in usage
cases is the necessity of demonstrating a custom's universality.
It is usually held that the court, of its own knowledge, can
determine the existence of a custom (including its scope) when
the custom is a general one, 24 whereas the parties must prove
a special trade custom.'12 One of the principal teachings of
Gentry 11 is that proof of a considerable degree of regularity is
required. That teaching is overlooked by the popular wisdom in
interpreting Gentry II.
12' A legislative classification can be held constitutionally reasonable if "based on
long standing custom and practice in the racing industry." See Jacobs v. Kentucky State
Racing Comm'n, 562 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1977).
1' 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
1-1 See KRS § 362.250(1) (1954); UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21 (1969).
'1' See, e.g., In re Bowling Green Mill Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1942).
"-' See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(2) (1981).
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Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent suggested that
a universal custom was involved. The dissent argued that Gen-
try's practice was "accepted" by the business, 2 6 while the ma-
jority said that "an accepted practice" will have no effect. 27
Neither side used the word customary, and this was no sloppy
use of language. The dissent quoted the finding of the trial court
in this respect. There was a "common" practice of horse owners
purchasing their own horses at auction. 2s Outside the partner-
ship context, this "occurs very frequently." But the practice of
a partner to bid on the sale in secret was only "occasional."
The secret bidding by a partner "might or might not" be within
the knowledge of the nonbidding partner. 29 Thus, while the
practice may be accepted, it does not very often occur-accord-
ing to the majority and dissent alike. 30
A federal court had characterized prior Kentucky law as
being adverse to accepting local customs in the face of general
legal rules, and had held that "mere frequency" is not enough
to establish a usage.' The custom must be "almost a universal
custom,"' 3 2 or perhaps even "uniform and notorious."'' 33 That
rule is applied "[iun its fullness' '1 34 in the law of contracts, and
less rigidly when a "tort" standard is to be adopted-where
"the great majority" may be the rule. 35
The more important point in Gentry II is that the majority
opinion holds that what people accept is of no consequence. 3 6
It agrees with Professor Gray: "Custom is what men do, not
12, See Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Ky. 1982) (Stephenson, J., dissent-
ing).
127 Id. at 576.
'12 Id. at 578 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
'" Id.
17 Id. at 576, 578.
"' See 132 F.2d at 283, construing Aulich v. Craigmyle, 59 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1933).
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Moore, 136 S.W.2d 1086, 1088 (Ky. 1940).
'" Illinois Central R. Co. v. Maxwell, 167 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Ky. 1943). "Only
what proves itself to every man and woman is so/Only what nobody denies is so."
WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, LEAVES OF GRASS (1940).
167 S.W.2d at 843.
" See Ellis v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 251 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ky. 1952). But see
Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky. 1968). The standards with
respect to custom in the law of torts are set out in RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §
295A (1965), in which the "reasonable" standard is stated also.
" See 642 S.W.2d at 576.
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what they think.'' 137 Any willingness to accept banditry would
be rejected-at least when actual banditry is not practiced. If it
were simply a matter of choosing what is accepted as right or
wrong (as the dissent said), the court would look to its own
morality rather than to that of the community at large, much
less a particular community:
Is the opinion of his community on a question of morality,
of right and wrong, not yet embodied in practice, a legitimate
source of Law to which a judge ought to subordinate his own
opinion? I know of no moralist or jurist who has answered
this question in the affirmative. 3
The difficult test of these standards often (though not in
Gentry I1) comes in meeting an operational definition: Exactly
what sort of proof is required? Obviously, proof of moral judg-
ment is nearly impossible. To the extent that practice reflects
acceptance, the common moral judgment provides an incidental
supporting public policy, but to find knowledge of something
that is not reflected in observable action is more than one can
ask of a court.
Even proof of practice is not simple. a9 It would seem clear
that a court could give no effect to the fact that horsemen work
"' J. GRAY, supra note 28, at 285 (emphasis in original). See also B. LEISER, supra
note 31, at 90-92.
" J. GRAY, supra note 28, at 290.
The largest problem can be in making a court penetrate even a clear custom. A
good example of this is found in Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975), in which
an appellate court reversed a judgment of the trial court, because the appellate court
failed to understand a thoroughbred breeding usage that is crystal clear. Thoroughbred
stallions are bred only between the beginning of each year and the end of July, the
"breeding season" being established so that young animals will be born shortly after
the beginning of the next year, and thus will be technically one year old (yearlings) after
they have lived for nearly a year. In Taylor, the plaintiff, owner of two thoroughbred
mares, had purchased the right to breed to a leading sire whose value increased enor-
mously between the time the plaintiff obtained his right to breed and the breeding season
when the right was to be exercised. The stallion's custodian first tried to avoid the
contract entirely, and then postponed the mare's breeding to the stallion-month after
month. When the next-to-last possible breeding time occurred, and there was another
postponement, the mare's owner had no choice but to breed the mare to another stallion.
The appellate court toyed with the idea that "the year 1966" meant the calendar year,
despite the industry custom. The court decided the case on the basis that there was one
more possible month of breeding even within the breeding season. By so holding, the
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out their problems when "foal sharing" deals fall through be-
cause of the death of the mare, or that promptly discovered
bone chips call for an adjustment of the deal. A custom to do
something that infinitely varies cannot be enforced.' 4° What if
there is a sharp divergence of testimony as to the existence of a
simpler custom? It was already clear under Kentucky law prior
to Gentry II that if there is real disagreement among the experts,
there is not even a jury question as to the reality of a custom.
The practice will be considered "a variable practice" and will
not be recognized by the courts.' 4' The Restatement requires
such "regularity of observance" as will "justify an expectation"
of the parties. 4 2 Whatever the exact parameters of the test, and
whatever the effect of conflicting proof, it is clear that an
"occasional" and a "might or might not" practice, however
morally agreeable or accepted in a business, is not the custom
and usage referred to in this body of law. 143
B. The Role of Competing Policies in Gentry II
A usage will be given application by reason of or in propor-
tion to its reasonability,' 44 and by now it seems clear that this is
a method of giving effect to any respectable policy consideration.
What a particular trade accepts may be irrelevant; what the
community demands is not.
Gentry II teaches again that a reasonability-policy-stand-
ard will be considered. In Gentry II, the policy was the one
court ignored the well-established custom of obtaining the first breeding early enough
in the breeding season so that if there is no conception, the mare can be returned again
(sometimes up to five or six times) to effect the purpose of the contract, and so that
the mare can foal early the next year and be ready for another breeding. The finder of
fact had determined "that the defendants were just giving [the plaintiff] the runaround,"
in a "wholly unwarranted, high-handed, and oppressive" manner. Id. at 431. Because
of the appellate court's failure to give effect to the custom, the defendants succeeded in
the appellate court. This custom relating to the breeding cycle was given a tax effect in
Reineman v. United States, 301 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1962).
'1 See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
1' See Beech Creek Coal Co. v. Jones, 262 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Ky. 1953).
"4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222(1) (1981).
- This distinction is discussed in Ebert v. Fort Pierre Moose Lodge, 312 N.W.2d
119, 124-25 (S.D. 1981).
- See U.C.C. § 1-205 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 (1981).
See also C. ALLEN, supra note 9, at 135-36; B. LEISER, supra note 31, at 65, 70, 156.
[Vol. 74
CUSTOM AND USAGE
imposed by the Uniform Partnership Act. Partners have a high
fiduciary duty toward one another. 45 This reflects an equally
potent common law standard. Justice Cardozo demanded "the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive."''
Given such a standard, Gentry II did not present the court
with a conflict any more difficult than the one it faced on the
question of universality. In some other case, there may be a
troubling issue-when, for example, the partner in Gentry's
position is merely silent, or when there is some temptation of
fairness to impute consent from the apparent knowledge of one
in Marsh's position. In the partnership context, however, fair-
ness will not be an issue. 47 And in Gentry II, the court affirm-
atively found "two covert acts" on Gentry's part with respect
to one partnership sale.1 48 After the second sale, "Gentry told
Marsh [the horse] had been sold to a third party,' ' 49 an affirm-
ative misstatement. With proof of conscious acts, the court need
not to be concerned further with competing equities.
It might be that a reasonability test would point in the same
direction for weaker facts. Courts had already held, before
Gentry II, that the strength of the partnership fiduciary rela-
tionship is such that consent will not be implied.' 50 Thus one
court held, "It scarcely need be again repeated that by estab-
lished principles of law . .. partners occupy a [fiduciary] rela-
tionship to other partners in the transaction of the partnership
business. A custom or practice that conflicts with established
principles of law governing such relationships cannot prevail."' 5'
Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1982).
141 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
'' Whether a fair price was received or a fair sale occurred is generally irrelevant
when there has been a fiduciary breach-the asset simply inures to the benefit of the
partnership at the price paid by the offending partner. See Graham v. Tom Moore
Distillery Co., 42 F. Supp. 853, 855 (W.D. Ky. 1941). See also Hutchings v. Louisville
Trust Co., 276 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1954); Stephens v. Stephens, 183 S.W.2d 822 (Ky.
1944); Hammonds v. Risner, 132 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1939); Konsuvo v. Netzk, 220 A.2d
424, 432 (N.J. 1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 comment (1)(b) (1960).
1,, 642 S.W.2d at 576.
11 Id. at 575-76 (Gentry bid on a partnership horse at an auction through a secret
agent and told Marsh that a buyer had been located for another horse that Gentry
actually purchased.).
See Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ala. 1968).
Id. at 127.
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Courts are willing to distinguish among different types of
enterprises and different degrees of fiduciary relationship. For
example, one would ordinarily presume the intention of an em-
ployer to pay compensation to an employee for his efforts.'5 2
When, however, the employee is a public employee-presumably
with the highest fiduciary duty of all workers-a "mere custom"
to pay such an employee "without express authority" would not
prevail. 53 Indeed, if the beneficiary of this rule is truly protected
by a fiduciary relationship, his own unreasonability is not held
against him. 5 4
In many ways, absent the contrary policy associated with
fiduciary duties, the thoroughbred industry appears to be a
reasonably appropriate business for the application of its own
standards. It is a fairly self-contained business, in which the
participants deal with one another and do not have direct contact
with a wider public.' One would not suppose that general public
policy considerations would frequently intrude.5 6 On the other
hand, unlike the New York diamond market that was the subject
of considerable analysis by Professor Furnish and several New
York courts discussed by him,'5 7 the thoroughbred horse business
is not entirely closed to outsiders. New participants come into
the business on a fairly frequent basis, and a "newcomer to a
trade is not bound by trade custom unless he knows of it or it
is so widespread that he may be presumed to have known of
it."'"" The courts may use caution in adopting customs that
"2 See Becker v. Nahm & Turner, Inc., 435 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Ky. 1968).
151 Harlan County v. Blair, 49 S.W.2d 1028, 1029 (Ky. 1932). See also City of
Fulton v. Shanklin, 122 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Ky. 1938).
'1 See Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. App. 1966); Muir v.
Samuels, 62 S.W. 481 (Ky. 1901).
"' It may not be an accident that the author of the dissent in Gentry 11 (Kentucky
Supreme Court Chief Justice Stephens) also wrote the dissent in Trimble v. North Ridge
Farms, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1985).
"- The commentary to the RESTATEMENT holds that if a "rule of Law" would
override an explicit contract, it would also override a usage-but not otherwise. Ras-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 comment c (1981). RESTATEMENT § 173 applies
a less rigorous rule to the "abuse of a fiduciary relation," making a contract voidable
unless "it is on fair terms" and the parties have a "full understanding" of their rights
and "all relevant facts ... the fiduciary knows or should know." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1981).
, ' See Furnish, supra note 28, at 42-48.
',s RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 comment b (1981).
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involve purchase and sale by persons who may be newcomers. 5 9
It is important, then, to note that for these considerable
reasons, Gentry 11 does not foreclose the applicability of industry
customs in the appropriate context.' ° Instead, that case raises
and easily settles some of the issues that will, however, continue
to confront courts in more difficult cases.
VI. FACTORS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN FINDING
A CUSTOM OR USAGE'
6 1
There are literally thousands of cases reflecting the tradi-
tional method of determining whether a proven custom or usage
will be considered in a contract situation. A typical formulation
of the test is as follows:
A local custom must be well established, reasonable and gen-
erally known, of such age, uniformity of observance, certainty,
fixedness of character and notoriety that a jury would be
justified in saying that it was known to the party sought to be
affected by it.162
Note the repeated use of the word "and." Each and every
factor must be present. With so rigid a rule, custom undoubtedly
"I See, e.g., J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 84. A newcomer in
the business should hire an adviser to teach him and lead him through the steps of
acquiring and managing his equine assets. One simply assumes in such a context that
this type of agent would be paid a fee, and have undivided loyalty to the newcomer,
irrespective of the custom described later in this Article. Id. at 136, 139, 143.
'c Neither the "usage of trade" provisions of the RESTATEMENT, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222 (1981), nor those of the Uniform Commercial Code, see
U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1972), both of which have been discussed previously, see notes 142-
144 supra and accompanying text, apply directly in the Gentry II situation. The duty
imposed on Gentry was one imposed by the partnership statute, not a contract of sale,
and prior to the statute, it was imposed by common law. Thus, a partnership is "founded
on a voluntary contract," but the fiduciary duties grow out of a "status arising out of
a contract." Elcomb Coal Co. v. Hall Land & Mining Co., 115 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Ky.
1938) (emphasis added).
'1- This list of factors will not be exclusive. Others will appear in a more thorough
examination of the cases, and in a fuller view of the realities. If it appears from the
analyses that are included in subsequent sections of this Article that all of the appropriate
factors were included in this section, that is because this one was written and rewritten
based upon what was found in the later cases and hypotheticals. It seems only fair to
admit that circularity.
1,1 In re Bowling Green Mill Co., 132 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir. 1942).
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would gradually disappear as a source of decision. Economic
life has become too complex, public policies too conflicting, and
above all, change comes too rapidly. Where the history of a
usage is or becomes "turbulent and discordant," where the
business is in a "state of flux," customs are not created-they
disappear. 63 This is not only a problem for courts over time, it
is also the most compelling argument against the adoption of
custom in the law.' 64 It would be easier if there were some more
stable source of decision. 65
If custom is to have any place in modern times, the factors
listed by the traditional judicial formulation (and related ones)
must be set out in a way in which they can be weighed against
each other, and on some acceptable scale.'66 With only Gentry
I/P67 and this general discussion as background, it is appropriate
to describe such a formulation. After this section of the Article,
then, it will be possible to flesh out some more parts of the
approach adopted, and to apply the same analysis to further,
diverse, apparently unrelated horse cases and hypothetical situ-
ations.
Although elsewhere there is no systematic analysis in these
terms, this Article's general, fluid approach is not itself radical.
The comments to the Restatement propose that the reasonability
"I See Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590,
602 (1944) (refusal to create a custom from "so turbulent and discordant a history");
Local 33, Int'l Hod Carriers Bldg. and Common Laborers' Union of America v. Mason
Tenders Dist. Council of Greater New York, 291 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1961) (refusal
to recognize a "custom and practice" when the "critical terms" were "in a state of
flux").
I'm Parrington, the economic realist, speaking of the Revolutionary debate, notes:
"If an unwritten constitution be no other than established practice ... then the current
practice of Parliament must be accepted as constitutional." V. PARRINGTON, supra note
35, at 191. Such was the "fatal weakness" of the argument. This Article agrees that it
is a weakness, but not "fatal" where adequate stability exists in a particular case. For
example, see Parrington's discussion of Francis Lieber, 2 V. PARRINGTON, supra note
59, at 89, in which even Parrington notes the "creative" use of such law. Id. at 92. See
also note 59 supra.
"I See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
"m See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 35, at 58. Reflecting his "iew that America
survives and grows because of accepted mores, reflected in customs, De Tocqueville
suggests that the central accepted maxim in the United States is that society must make
a specific call on its citizens to limit their individual freedom-a "maxim" of "general
influence" in American practice. Id.
" 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
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of the usage bear both upon the finding relevant to the existence
of the usage, 68 and upon the decision to import it into an
agreement irrespective of the parties' knowledge of it.169 Simi-
larly, a case involving an established custom of real estate bro-
kers in a particular locality reflects a like flexibility:
There being no evidence to the contrary, the court did not err
in assuming the existence of the custom. Nor is there any
ground on which the custom may be attacked. It is not pro-
hibited by statute, or violative of any established rule of law.
It is not unreasonable, but appears to be a fair and just
solution of a trying question. In entering into the arrangement
by which the trade was finally consummated, appellants and
appellees did not use any language, or intimate in any way,
that the custom was not to prevail. 70
If the question is whether to disregard a clear usage, a court
would call on the same approach. A well-established custom,
understood by the parties, will not be given effect when a party
(even the government) seeks to rely on it in "'an unfair and
dishonest manner.''7 In short, some cases and authorities ac-
knowledge a constant interplay among factors that were tradi-
tionally treated as discreet tests, and a court, exercising its
traditional analysis of policy concerns, will arbitrate among them.
There are two types of factors involved in judging the effec-
tiveness of the custom. The first type goes directly to whether it
is truly logical that contracting parties consciously knew of, and
thereupon knowingly consented to, a contract term or interpre-
tation. A second type relates to the relative readiness of the law
to make an implication or presumption based on some policy
consideration. The first type implies a policy consideration of
its own-society has an interest in -enforcing the expectations
and intentions of the parties. The second type includes that
policy consideration-it may call for the court to create a con-
tract where otherwise one might not have existed. The second
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 comment b (1981).
See id. at § 220 comment c (1981).
' Maddox-Grundy Co. v. Helm, 37 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Ky. 1931).
' Molton, Allen and Williams, Inc. v. Harris, 613 F.2d 1176, 1181 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The same negative implication from unreasonability limits the use of custom in
tort law as well. See Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 155 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Ky. 1941).
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type also leaves open all other policy issues, and it will influence
a decision whether to permit or require an "implication" of a
term from more or less clear proof of a custom requiring that
term, and also whether to create a presumption as to how to
settle a question on conflicting proof.
The predominant characteristic of the first type is "noto-
riety" and those parts of any other category from the earlier
cases suggesting notoriety:
(a) The length of the parties' participation in the busi-
ness. The required length of time will be affected by the nature
of the business and of the sort of participants who are, or a'e
likely to be, before the court on the issue at hand. Is it a
business that deals with the public, or only with participants
who have access to its intricacies?
(b) The frequency with which the custom is observed. It
should be noted here that a "universal" custom may be prac-
ticed only twice a year, while a variable practice may be found
five hundred times a year and violated an equal number of
times. Thus, frequency may be as important as universality. 72
(c) The openness of the industry's discussion of the cus-
tom. Does it frequently appear in "form" contracts?
(d) Whether the custom has obtained so much force that
the industry participants perceive a sense of duty associated
with it. In the real world there is in fact such a difference in
perception. One asks the question: "On certain facts, is certain
behavior required?" Any lawyer experienced in litigating cases
involving the proof of custom will recall many occasions when
a client or witness has answered "yes"-and then "corrected"
himself to defer to the attorney as to what "the law" and
facts require. The instinctive perception ought to matter. 73
172 The antiquity of a custom is related to this factor. See note 178 infra and
accompanying text. Despite the comment above that the age of a pernicious custom will
not save it, see note 45 supra and accompanying text, it is clear that the antiquity of a
fair or neutral custom will enhance its recognition by the law. See Davis v. Board of
County Commissioners of Carbon County, 495 P.2d 21, 23 (Wyo. 1972), overruled on
other grounds, Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 (Wyo.
1974); City and County of Denver v. Madison, 351 P.2d 826, 830 (Colo. 1960).
"I This consideration introduces enormous complexities, and may be impractical.
This article has made much of the fact that the court will not take "acceptance" into
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Before passing on to the other type of factor, there should
be noted a frequent statement in the custom and usage cases
that is not adopted as a subparagraph (e). It is said that custom
will not be invoked to create "an option, or discretion" for one
of the parties. 74 This is an erroneous application of the correct
principle that there is no enforceable custom when practices are
in fact contested or in flux. 7 There should be no obstacle to
the creation of a right or duty by custom, simply because the
beneficiary of the right or duty may or may not avail himself
of it. What the law formally calls an option is no different in
principle from any legal right, which may or may not be enforced
by the person possessing it. The only formal difference is that
the holder of the option has given his consideration in advance
of knowing whether performance is expected of the other party.
The second group of factors-the pure "policy" factors-
would include:
(a) Whether there will be a contract if the custom is not
given effect. This is an expression of a common principle of
contract law. 7 6
(b) Whether the custom is merely to be used to interpret,
or whether it is called on to make a substantial supplement to
an agreement. This factor is the converse of factor (a). One
would encourage contract formation, but one would not want
to extend express contracts beyond their own terms, other
factors being equal.
account absent actual practice. See notes 136-143 supra and accompanying text. This
factor at least has the advantage of requiring both practice and a form of acceptance.
At a deeper level, this consideration raises the issue of opinio necessitatis, which was an
original basis for the application of custom in the courts. It suggests that "individuals
purposely follow a certain rule simply because they believe it to be a rule of law."
Watson, An Approach to Customary Law, 1984 Iu. L. REv. 561, 563. Watson debunks
that basis for customary law, because it provides no mechanism for change, and because
its reasoning is circular. This Article's formulation does not have those difficulties.
Allowing for such a factor-and recognizing that it is only a factor-leaves open the
possibility of custom as a source not only of "descriptive laws" but also "normative or
prescriptive laws". B. LmsmR, supra note 31, at 44 (citing John Stuart Mill). See note
166 supra.
See, e.g., Aulich v. Craigmyle, 59 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Ky. 1933).
"' See notes 162-163 supra and accompanying text.
'7 First Nat. Bank v. Doherty, 161 S.W. 211 (Ky. 1913); Berry v. Frisbie, 86 S.W.
558 (Ky. 1905).
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(c) The existence and degree of the fiduciary relationship
between the parties.
(d) On which side of the fiduciary relationship the custom
imposes a duty. There may in fact be balancing duties. "'
(e) The antiquity of the custom. Weight would be given
to the collective wisdom reflected by great antiquity. 17,
(f) The inherent fairness and utility of the usage. As
practitioners well know, courts often leave such concerns un-
spoken, or advert to them apparently in passing. They should
be recognized and weighed directly with other factors. 7 9
(g) The existence of a penal or other supporting or com-
peting statute that declares an independent legislative or socie-
tal policy. When the legislature has declared a policy, that
policy would be given as much consideration as a court-created
policy. Thus, if a court has the alternative of choosing or
rejecting a custom to enforce, it may be influenced by the fact
that the custom is supported by a legislative policy. When the
legislature has created a penalty, however, the effect may be
ambivalent: if the enforcement of a marginally understood
custom results in the imposition of a jail sentence, a court
might be less likely to enforce it.11°
'" Recall that Gentry was the managing partner in Gentry II and, therefore, the
duty was imposed on his side of the fiduciary relationship. 642 S.W.2d at 576.
178 See cases cited supra note 172. The caveat is put best by Mill, "The traditions
and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience
has taught them; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his deference: but,
in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; .... Customs are made for
customary circumstances, and customary characters; and his circumstances or his char-
acters may be uncustomary." J. MILL, supra note 59, at 72 (emphasis in original).
I" The need of Kentucky's thoroughbred industry to accommodate new entrants is
explicitly recognized in Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton Kentucky, Inc., 703 S.W.2d 885 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1986).
'I See Vermilion County Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Izzard, 249 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Il1.
Ct. App. 1969) (giving special force to the penal nature of the statute, in overcoming
the effect of the custom); Spirko v. Commonwealth, 480 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Ky. 1972)
(intention to abrogate the common law by statute must be clearly apparent). What we
believe to be the correct approach is reflected by many of the cases that consider the
civil effect of a "civil" complaint under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations RICO statute. See, e.g., I.S. Joseph Co., v. J. Lauritzen A/S, 751 F.2d
265 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1000 (6th Cir. 1982)
("unfair reflection upon innocent individuals.").
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As suggested at the outset, this Article advances no general
theory as to how the two types of factors interplay with each
other. Specific contexts call for their own analysis.
This analysis can be applied to Gentry II: As to the notoriety
factors, factor (a) (length of participation in the business) is not
applicable because of the partnership context, but the remaining
three factors were openly discussed. As to the policy factors in
Gentry II, factor (a) (contract creation) would not be applicable,
and factor (b) (degree of change of existing contract) would lean
modestly against applying the custom. Of course, factors (c) and
(d) (relating to fiduciary duties) were the critical ones, along
with factor (g) (existence of a statute). Factors (e) (antiquity)
and a part of (f) (fairness) are not applicable because of the
partnership context. The "utility" of encouraging outsiders to
invest in Kentucky's thoroughbred industry was an unspoken
imperative of the decision.
In this, as in any other area of modern law, the application
of such factors does not make it easy for a lawyer to advise his
clients. The simplest rule is that when one or more of the first
set of factors clearly and positively applies, and no contrary
policy from the second set intrudes-and especially if some such
policy supports it-the custom should be given effect. The rea-
sonable expectations of the parties usually should be enforced.
An example of this rule is discussed in section seven of this
Article. 8 '
On the opposite extreme, an overwhelming policy arising out
of the second group of factors would change the result. When
a case involves a long-standing, continuously recognized fidu-
ciary relationship of the highest sort, imposed upon the person
seeking to enforce the custom in the face of a clear statutory
proscription, the custom will not be allowed to govern. Gentry
II typifies this sort of case.
Even among the second set of factors there will be tension,
and the two sets will offset each other. 82 Many other permuta-
tions are conceivable. Generations of adherence may overcome
the apparent force of a modern theory embodied in a statute or
"I See notes 185-211 infra and accompanying text.
"' See notes 213-246 infra and accompanying text.
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case. When the custom goes to "mere" interpretation of an
agreement-directing itself to filling a gap in an ambiguous
situation-the even greater antiquity of a conflicting rule may
be ignored. 83
The issues which follow could not be more diverse; but a
proper analysis of each situation has in common with the others
a recognition of judicial balancing of competing public poli-
cies. 8 4
VII. THE CUSTOMARY USE OF JOCKEY CLUB PAPERS
The context of Gentry P81 called to the court's attention an
underlying fact in the thoroughbred horse business: "[T]he Jockey
Club in New York ... customarily, and by agreement of thor-
oughbred owners throughout the country, controls the important
task of registration of thoroughbred horses and the issuance of
the proper papers for foals."'18 6 The Jockey Club has been de-
scribed as consisting "largely of socially prominent people inter-
ested in horse racing," whose main function is "maintaining
registries of thorougbred horses....
The Jockey Club's function in Gentry I was to provide
Gentry with a proper identification of the mare he bought. 83
The Jockey Club also provides a fund of information as to what
are truly the customs in the industry, 89 and provides the sole
efficient way to maintain the effective purity of thoroughbred
bloodlines. ,90
The Jockey Club registry's primary and long-recognized
function is to establish the right (under various state laws) of
the person named on the Jockey Club papers to race a horse of
'' See notes 247-270 infra and accompanying text.
The same is true when "state of the art" is judicially or legislatively injected
into traditional "reasonable man" analysis, and thus "common practice" is diluted or
abandoned in tort analysis. See note 88 supra.
Schleicher v. Gentry, 554 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. at 885.
,17 Halpern v. Lomenzo, 367 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 & n.l (Sup. Ct. 1975).
See 554 S.W.2d at 885.
See Keck v. Wacker, 413 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (E.D. Ky. 1978).
See Jockey Club v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 419, 421 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 834 (1956).
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racing age.' 9' The most interesting question raised by Jockey
Club registration papers, however, is what effect, if any, they
have in solving questions of title. It is clear that a horse cannot
race at any racetrack in America (and a mare's offspring cannot
be registered) unless the person purporting to control the horse
has possession of properly completed Jockey Club papers. Does
the person shown thereon also own the horse? The court in
Baram v. Farugia92 came close to so holding. The court said
repeatedly that the execution and delivery of the papers consti-
tuted a "transfer" of the horse. 93
The problem with that court's decision, however, is that it
was not informed of the industry's customary disregard of the
Jockey Club papers on title questions. Although it is almost
universally true that the Jockey Club papers are executed and
the registration at the Jockey Club in New York is changed,
when title to the thoroughbred horse changes hands, that process
of registration is not considered crucial or relevant to title mat-
ters. 94 Ownership ordinarily passes by other means. Thus, at
auctions, titles pass upon the fall of the hammer; 95 and in
19, See Security First Nat'l Bank v. Tattersall, 311 So. 2d 218, 222 (La. 1975);
Morgan v. New York Racing Ass'n, 421 N.Y.S.2d 249, 251 (App. Div. 1979).
-"2 606 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1979). See also In re Blankinship-Cooper, Inc., 43 B.R.
231, 234 n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984) (citing Lester, Security Interests in Thoroughbred
and Standardbred Horses: A Transactional Approach, 70 Ky. L.J. 1065 (1981-82)).
9 See 606 F.2d at 43, 46.
I'm Even in the trotting horse business, where registration papers play a much more
dominant role than in the thoroughbred business, they are not "documents of title."
Susi v. Belle Action Stables, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). It is only when
new registration papers are obtained and the new party begins "racing the horse as
owner" that enough ownership is claimed to amount to a conversion-"a proclamation
of title to the racing world." Susi v. Bell Acton Stables, Inc., 360 F.2d 704, 713 (2d
Cir. 1966). Citing these cases, Professor Anderson, U.C.C., § 1-201:83, says: "It does
not appear that a certificate of registration for a horse is a document of title within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 1-201(15)." See also last two cases cited in note 6 supra.
'"I This Article notes later that the legal conclusion that parties place upon their
acts-how they characterize their "intentions"-does not determine the true legal con-
sequences of what they have done. See note 239 infra and accompanying text. In a well-
known, reputable text on the thoroughbred horse business, the authors make exactly
that sort of mistake. See J. LOHIAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 84-85, in
which the authors note that the "risks and responsibilit[ies]" among the parties change
upon the fall of the hammer, as specifically provided in most auction catalogs, but one
page later say that "title" passes when the Jockey Club papers are transferred. See id.
at 85. One must be careful of "legal" words used by non-lawyers.
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claiming races, statutes control the passing of title. 96 Each form
of transaction has its own type of documentation. The registra-
tion process follows in due course thereafter. Formal transfer in
negotiated sales is now traditionally accomplished by bills of
sale, separate and apart from (although coordinated with) the
transfer of Jockey Club papers. The papers themselves are used
to accomodate the racing of the animal, often not in the true
owner's name. They are often largely ignored when the horse is
retired to breeding-as was the case in Gentry L 197
Although a newcomer to the business might not know of
this practice, 98 and thus may be entitled to a different treatment,
this usage was known to the parties in Simpkins v. Ritter,199
which is a leading case on the subject.
In Simpkins, the owner of a horse of racing age (Simpkins)
executed in blank and delivered to his trainer (Ritter) the Jockey
Club papers. Ritter was authorized to fill in his name as trans-
feree. No bill of sale or other written document was prepared
or executed. The testimony for Simpkins was that the transfer
was to facilitate the trainer's racing of the horse, and further to
permit the trainer to receive the proceeds of racing for one
year 2°°-presumably to encourage him to pay special attention
to developing the racing skills of this particular animal. The
testimony for Ritter was that the document was executed as an
absolute transfer of the animal. 20 1 The trial court found, as a
matter of fact, that the parties intended an absolute transfer and
not a mere bailment.202 The dissent in the appellate court agreed;
it emphasized the well-settled principle of law that the factual
determinations of the finder of fact will not be overturned on
contested proof. The dissent further pointed out that the Jockey
Club papers themselves speak of "transfer," and that the Ne-
' See J. HUMPHREYS, supra note 111, at 256.
The Gentry I court established that even when the mare was sold in January,
"it was the common and accepted practice to make these [identification] checks in
August." 554 S.W.2d at 885.
See Burket v. Claypool, 39 N.E.2d 873, 876-77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
204 N.W.2d 383 (Neb. 1973).
110 Id. at 384.
' Id. at 384. Ritter did admit that the horse was to be returned at the end of his
racing career. Id.
202 Id.
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braska legislature adopted those papers in connection with
"ownership." The dissent made the perfectly reasonable argu-
ment that even if the papers did not themselves establish own-
ership, they are "admissible evidence on the issue of
ownership. '203 That ought to be enough, taken together with
Ritter's testimony, to establish his title-held the dissent. 204
The majority opinion in Simpkins noted the greater "believ-
ability" of the original owner's testimony. 25 One would think
that factor would not be enough to overturn a finding of fact
by the trial court.206 The appellate court, however, recognized
the industry custom to treat the "transfer" as merely a transfer
of the papers and possession, and not a transfer of title:
Simpkins contended the transfer of the certificate of foal reg-
istration was made in order to permit Kate Ritter to race the
horse during the 1971 racing season. She adduced other evi-
dence indicating that such arrangements are frequently made
in the racing business. 20 7
At a minimum, the court in Simpkins held that even a
"frequent" industry custom is admissible evidence of intention
of the parties. 20s Viewed more precisely, if the frequent use of
the papers to create a mere bailment is universally known, that
use can be taken as a universal custom of recognizing the neu-
trality of papers as they affect title. That is, the frequency of
transferring the papers without intending to transfer title can be
taken to establish the fact that they are not considered title
papers standing alone. The affirmative custom of passing title
by other means (auction rules and papers, claiming statutes and
documents, and bills of sale) was not discussed, but is the
Id. at 386 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Iu d.
-: "It tests credulity to believe that under the circumstances she would give the
horse to Kate [Ritter] for its entire racing life. The testimony of Simpkins is much more
within the range of believability." Id. at 384.
"I See id. at 385 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
Id. at 384.
- The court treats the title issues as if they included all of the issues of ownership
rights, including, that is, a contract for the transfer of title. Except for the statute of
frauds, see U.C.C. § 2-201 (1972), a horse can be sold and transferred under an oral
agreement. See Di Marco v. King, 139 So. 2d 750, 751 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962).
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positive way of saying what the court said. With that understand-
ing, and in the face of further evidence to support the non-
customary conclusion, Simpkins can be taken to hold that an
industry custom will conclusively establish the understanding of
the parties in a transaction.
One is required, however, to explain how it is that a proven
oral agreement will not be given effect, merely because a con-
trary practice is "frequently" adopted. Despite the clear prac-
tices associated with passage of title, many horsemen still think
that the papers have something to do with "title. ' 2 0 9 Perhaps
one can take the Simpkins court's analysis to be one special case
of the rule that "acts which are known to be contrary to the
rule cannot affect the rule's efficacy. ' 210 But can this be so in
the face of an established oral contract? The ultimate answer
must be no.
This conceptual problem aside-assuming there had been no
oral testimony for the trainer-Simpkins is ideal for illustrating
the application of the factors outlined in the preceeding section
of this Article.2 1 The notoriety factors-raising directly the issue
of intent-include factors (a) (longevity) and (c) (openness),
which encourage the application of the custom. Factors (b)
(frequency) and (d) (sense of duty) do so as well, once Simpkins'
conceptual problem (the presence of testimony of an actual oral
agreement) is overcome. Indeed, Simpkins is a useful case for
demonstrating the applicability of the "sense-of-duty" factor-
and showing its relationship to the "frequency" factor: Mere
"frequency" is enough when the industry understands the im-
plication of the frequent practice.
As to the second set of factors-the policy issues-the first
two (having to do with the level at which the contract is affected)
are neutral in this case, as is factor (g) (the existence of a separate
statute). That is, there are identifiable legal relations among the
parties, no matter how the case turns out, and no statute sup-
ports the plaintiff or the defendant in this situation.
The remaining factors all support the application of the
custom. The fiduciary relationship in this case-factors (c) and
2" See note 195 supra.
2-" Watson, supra note 173, at 565. See note 173 supra and accompanying text.
2-" See notes 172-180 supra and accompanying text.
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(d)-is that of a bailee, perhaps an entrustee. That relationship,
however, should not have been strong enough to overcome proof
of the parties' agreement. Even the Gentry II partnership would
have had no such effect had Marsh -actually agreed to Gentry's
purchases.
There is, however, a special utility to be found in the appli-
cation of the custom in Simpkins-now applying policy factor
(f). The business demands an easy way to create bailments
sufficient to allow the horse to race about the country, without
fear of creating the appearance that title has been transferred.
A fair conclusion, then, is that the Jockey Club papers could
be treated presumably as neutral as to title. The rule would be
different from the standard approach to automobile registration-
title issues, in which the general rule seems to be that registration
will create a rebuttable presumption of title.21 2 The acid test
would appear to come in some future case when a party will
claim that the Jockey Club papers satisfy the statute of frauds-
such as U.C.C. section 2-201. The position of this Article is that
they should not. If no exception to the statute is available, the
result of Simpkins would be correct.
VIII. THE CUSTOMARY COMPENSATION OF
THE BLOODSTOCK AGENT
One of the most peculiar features of the thoroughbred horse
business is the existence of the "bloodstock agent. ' 21 3 No other
industry quite replicates the bloodstock agent's role. Unlike real
estate brokers, insurance agents and securities salesmen, there is
no public or trade agency that registers or regulates their con-
duct. One need only declare himself or herself to be a bloodstock
agent-and a bloodstock agent is born. For that reason, the
quality and performance of bloodstock agents varies widely.
Indeed, the rush of new competitors, and the consequent will-
ingness of some of them to accept and promote deals on any
"1 See Siler v. Williford, 350 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1961); McKenzie v. Oliver, 571
S.W.2d 102, 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
21' A bloodstock agent has been defined as: "A broker who represents the purchaser
or seller (or both) of thoroughbreds at public or private sale, generally in exchange for
a commission." J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 210. But see note 216
infra.
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terms, has served to destabilize the traditional customs and
practices in the business. 21 4
There is a traditional custom among bloodstock agents and
their clients under which the seller pays the bloodstock agent's
commission unless there is an agreement to the contrary.
Coupled with that custom, however, is another standard,
complicating factor: Potential buyers often engage a bloodstock
agent to find a mare with a certain bloodline, or an interest in
a certain stallion (share), or the right to breed once to a stallion
(season). No seller (who is expected to pay the fee) has yet been
located. In another ordinary fact pattern-certainly the most
usual one in the old days of the thoroughbred business-both a
willing buyer and willing seller at different times mention a
mutual, complimentary interest to a bloodstock agent who is a
friend and/or business associate of both of them. One has a
mare for sale and another wants to buy such a mare-or share
or season. In either case, fees often are not discussed. The usual
fee (which now seems to be five percent of the purchase price)2"1
is understood, and there is sometimes a sense of impropriety in
openly acknowledging that a friendly transaction is to be done
for compensation-although everyone knows that it is.216
The bloodstock agent, then, is paid by the seller, although
his principal is the buyer, or both buyer and seller.
With that background, the commercial bribery statutes of
various states, and of the United States, should be noted. Several
states have adopted the provisions of the Model Penal Code:
"(1) A person commits a misdemeanor if he solicits, accepts
or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly
violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he
is subject as:
(a) partner, agent or employee of another....
214 For a general discussion of the pros and cons of employing a bloodstock agent,
see J. LOHMAN & A. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 236.
"1 Id. at 135.
21 See id. at 10. It is worth noting that these same authors have again misused a
legal term (this time "broker"), to give this Article the opportunity once again to caution
that experts should be asked to testify only about actions, and not about legal conclu-
sions.
217 MODEL PENAL CODE § 224.8 (1962).
[Vol. 74
CUSTOM AND USAGE
Two of the most active thoroughbred states have their own,
more specific, commercial bribery statutes. Kentucky's statute
proscribes benefits to an agent for "conduct contrary to his
employer's or principal's best interests" or "without the con-
sent" of the principal, "contrary to his fiduciary obligation. '218
The New York statute describes the crime as accepting a
benefit "without the consent" of the principal to "influence his
conduct in relation to his employer's or principal's affairs. "219
The model act incorporates whatever "duty of fidelity" as
established by common law or other statutes (which, as Gentry
II notes, emphasize the principal's "consent") 220 while the Ken-
tucky and New York statutes focus explicitly on the "consent"
of the principal.
New York courts have decided several civil cases under its
criminal statute. 2 It is clear that the criminal statute creates a
civil liability, 2m and allows a defense to the enforcement of
contracts infected with an offending practice;23 but it is also
apparent that "consent" is given a fairly broad reading: "It
would seem there could be no violation of the statute if the
principal or employer had knowledge and either approved or
condoned the act of his employee or agent." 224
A Massachusetts court has added a further liberalizing gloss
to its statute, requiring "secretiveness," an element of affirma-
tive stealth directed toward the principal. This requirement is
not satisfied when the fee is offered openly to any agent who
should come to the seller. 5
KRS § 518.020 (Bobbs-Merrill 1975).
-' N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (West Supp. 1984-85).
• See Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1982).
See, e.g., Donemar v. Molloy, 169 N.E. 610 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1930); Berry
Packing Corp. v. Packer's Super Markets, Inc., 255 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1965);
Shemin v. A. Black & Co., 240 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Nathanson v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 68 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
... See 169 N.E. at 611.
_" See 255 N.Y.S.2d at 692; 240 N.Y.S.2d at 624; 68 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21.
2' June Fabrics, Inc. v. Teri Sue Fashions, Inc., 81 N.Y.S.2d 877, 882 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
22 See N.J. Gendron Lumber v. Great Northern Homes, Inc., 395 N.E.2d 457, 461
(Mass. Ct. App. 1979) (defendant offered the bonus to all of its customers on a "to-
whom-it-may-concern basis").
1985-861
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In addition to the various state acts, a portion of the Robin-
son-Patman Act creates a similar crime.2 6 This federal statute
also is held to create a state cause of action.2 7 The Sixth Circuit
opinion in Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co.23 is
particularly interesting in that it notes that this cause of action,
unlike the standard Robinson-Patman requirement, does not
require the showing of competitive injury.229 In this holding, the
court is supported by other cases. 20 A Ninth Circuit cases'
implies the "consent' exception-not explicit in the statute-by
emphasizing the special importance of the fiduciary relationship
under this statute. 232
Even without a state or federal criminal statute from which
a civil action can be derived or implied, similar responsibilities
are created at common law. In a modern reported case about a
bloodstock agent, a Kentucky court in Beasley v. Tronte-3 held
that a contract of purchase and sale of a thoroughbred horse
can be void if the agent of the seller is also acting in the interest
of the buyer-without the consent of the seller.2 4 This result
follows irrespective of whether there is any ill-intent or injury
to the principal as required by the Kentucky criminal statute. 235
For purposes of this analysis, Beasley would apply in the con-
verse situation as well, and is clearly in accord with general
law.
236
26 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1985).
.2 See 255 N.Y.S.2d at 692. See also Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co., 136 F.2d 12, 16 (6th Cir. 1943); Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp.
1339, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
Id. at 15.
See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F.
Supp. 633, 640 (D. Alaska 1982). But see Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic
Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must be hurt by alleged anticompetitive
conduct); 418 F. Supp. at 1347 (principal purpose of payments was to induce business
transactions with particular defendants).
1-1 Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nilson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1966).
Id. at 858.
677 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 894.
21 See KRS § 518.020.
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 313 (1958). But see RESTATEMENT
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Thus we have formulated a test of the importance of a
custom in this industry: When a bloodstock agent is paid by the
seller-but was hired by the buyer or both-does the "custom"
establish the buyer's "consent" without further proof of an
express agreement or subjective satisfaction by the buyer? Is the
sale voidable? Do the bloodstock agent and the seller go to jail?
The clearest way to pose the question under a traditional
analysis is to ask first whether there has been one joint agency
created, or two separate, unrelated agency contracts. If both
principals are party to the same deal, their "consents" are each
a part of that implied or presumed agreement.
The existence of a joint agency is properly and traditionally
determined by referring to the customs of the particular trade
and notions of reasonability. In the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY, for example, two of the five factors listed by the
Restatement directly involve usages in the particular business,
and the third involves the public policy supporting the transac-
tion.237 Such a determination frequently will depend on the trade
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (1981). The focus of this portion of this Article is on the
notion of "consent." We make nothing of any difference between the word "knowledge"
as misused in various cases and authorities, and the word consent, although the latter
plainly suggests something more active than the former. The "agreement" of a principal
suggest something more active still. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892
(1979) (definition of consent) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 3, 4 (1981)
(definitions of agreement, bargain and promise). Most issues can be resolved by an
application of a formula much like that in June Fabrics. See note 224 supra and
acompanying text. A combination of knowledge with either approval or condonation,
seems a reasonable approach to the psychological or cognitive issues raised. The Re-
statements suggest the fair approach, focusing on the reasonable expectations of the
parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). See also Thompson-Starrett
Co. v. Mason's Adm'rs., 201 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Ky. 1946).
11 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 34 (1958), which states:
An authorization is interpreted in light of all accompanying circumstances,
including among other matters:
(a) the situation of the parties, their relations to one another, and the
business in which they are engaged;
(b) the general usages of business, the usages of trades or employments
of the kind to which the authorization relates, and the business method of
the principal;
(c) facts of which the agent has notice respecting the objects which the
principal desires to accomplish;
(d) the nature of the subject matter, the circumstances under which the
act is to be performed and the legality or illegality of the act; and
(e) the formality or informality, and the care, or lack of it, with which
an instrument evidencing the authority is drawn. (emphasis added.)
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involved, and even on the geographical area in a very narrow
range.23 Thus in a modern Second Circuit case, a broker was
held to be an agent of both parties to a transaction, because
that level of authority was "the customary practice of charter
brokerage in the market" in which they acted, irrespective of
the fact that neither party thought of the agent as his agent.3 9
Agency depends "not on their intentions or beliefs as to what
they have done", but instead on their "manifest conduct" by
participation in that business. 240 The Second Circuit was wholly
consistent with its prior decisions when it stated in dictum in a
thoroughbred auction case24' that "an agent dealing on behalf
of several undisclosed principals" may rely on custom to take
one principal's money and apply it to a third party's claim
against that principal. 242 It is only one step further to say that
he can apply it to his own benefit.
That additional step is not a great one. If the parties have
agreed (explicitly or by the appropriate adoption of a custom)
to a contract of joint agency, they have agreed to all of the
terms of that contract. Every contract includes a duty to pay
compensation,2 43 and the amount of the compensation can be
set in accordance with what is fair, custom being an appropriate
source of evidence for that standard.2" This latter use of custom
is a tort type of application, but the general proposition-that
the agreement of joint agency carries with it the agreement to
238 See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 522 F.2d 369,
376 (2d Cir. 1975) (remanded to determine "the usages of the Madison Avenue adver-
tising business"); R.H. Kyle Furniture Co. v. Russell Dry Goods Co., 340 S.W.2d 220,
225 (Ky. 1960) (interpreting the custom of a local dry goods store).
21 See Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat'l Shipping and Trading Corp., 523 F.2d
527, 537 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
11 Id. at 537 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I comment b (1958)).
241 Fuller v. Fasig-Tipton Co., 587 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1978).
242 Id. at 107 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 299 comment a (1958)).
... See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 441 (1958). See also Simmons v.
Atteberry, 310 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Ky. 1958); Spitzlberger v. Johns, 163 S.W.2d 286, 287
(Ky. 1942).
'" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 443 (1958). See also Vogt Bros. Mfg.
v. Stansbury, 304 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Ky. 1957). For example, "hot walkers," whose duty
is to cool off racehorses, traditionally are compensated out of purses, a practice that is
given legal effect. See Daugherty v. Catherwood, 264 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1965).
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pay fair compensation-seems to be the only logical approach
to the question.245
One need consider, then, only the prior question-whether
the joint agency (with its attendant compensation provision) will
be adopted and enforced by the court. Again, the factors to be
taken into account for all such questions are in fact appropriate
to this one. As to the notoriety factors, the key issue will be
factor (a)-the length of the principal's participation in the
business. If the buyer in the particular case is a newcomer and
has hired the agent generally to advise him, and if it is apparent
that the buyer has relied on the bloodstock agent to make critical
business judgments and to teach him the business, then consent
will not readily be implied. Otherwise, every other factor of the
first type leads to the conclusion that the principal gave his or
her "consent."
The policy factors are similarly applicable and positive, ex-
cept if a newcomer is involved as the principal. This time it is
factors (c) and (d) that matter-the newcomer is protected by a
fiduciary relationship. Factor (a) (whether there will be a con-
tract without a custom-made one) will usally encourage enforce-
ment of a custom like the one here proposed. Factor (b) will
thus usually be inapplicable, since there is usally no contract
without the custom, there can be no further question of adding
to or interpreting an otherwise-created contract.
Factor (e) (the antiquity of the custom) in this context sup-
ports the implication of consent, and factor (f) (the fairness and
utility of the transaction) will usually, strongly support the ap-
plication of the custom to the experienced horseman. Factor (g)
(the existence of a statute) is usually circular in such a situation,
and thus inapplicable.
In short, among experienced horsemen, "consent" should
usually be found; and with a newcomer, the contrary result
should often be reached.
The same analysis applies even if the parties have-testified
that the agency is not a joint agency.246 Thus, if there were
211 Louisville Cement Co. v. Clell Coleman & Sons, 300 S.W. 633, 635-36 (Ky.
1927).
-1 That is what happened on remand in Beasley v. Trontz, 677 S.W.2d 891 (Ky.
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conversations that establish that the agent was clearly not rep-
resenting the seller, there still might be a term implied in the
contract of agency between the agent and the buyer-principal to
the effect that "the agent must seek his compensation from
someone other than the principal." Or there might be a condi-
tion implied in the agreement between the buyer and the seller
to the effect that "the seller will pay all agents' fees." The
permutations of such fact situations are almost infinite, and the
reasonability of such implied contract provisions will depend on
the particular facts, but the factors that are directly applicable
in the more traditional joint agency context can be applied in
any such situation.
IX. THE CUSTOMARY SALE OF A BREEDING RIGHT
The central business transaction in the thoroughbred business
is the contract for the mating of a stallion and a mare. If the
breeder owns both, there is no need for such a transaction; but
typically, the owner of a mare sets out to purchase the right to
breed to a stallion in which he does not own an interest, or a
stallion share owner sets out to dispose of a right to breed that
he does not plan to use in a particular year. Such a right is
called a "season" or a "nomination" to the stallion.
247
The season is bought ordinarily on one of two bases. The
traditional method of purchase was on a "live foal" basis-
sometimes called a "guaranteed" basis. Most written "stallion
service agreements" provide-and it is well understood even
without such a provision-that a live foal season fee is earned
by the stallion owner only "when the foal stands and nurses. ' 24-
Ct. App. 1984). The agent made it clear that he was the agent of the seller only. The
judgment after remand is now on appeal. Cf. Hicks Realty Co. v. Stabile Const. Co.,
Inc., 292 S.W. 780 (Ky. 1927) (statement of joint representation by agent may be mere
conclusion of law).
14, For a general discussion of thoroughbred breeding, see J. LOHMAN & A. KIRK-
PATRICK, supra note 99, at 119-22.
" See id. at 120. There is a difference among agreements (and thus no custom) as
to whether the relevant nursing must be unassisted. Most foals need help the first time
or two. The mechanics of operating a live foal season sale are described in Braugh v.
Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. 1977). A discussion of appropriate provisions to be
included in such agreements is contained in Knopp, Landen and Donath, The Prevention
and Treatment of Breeding Contract Controversies, 74 Ky. L.J. 715 (1985-86).
[Vol. 74
CUSTOM AND USAGE
In earlier times, such a deal was sometimes described as "foal
insured ' 24 9 or as "a contract of warranty. ' 25 0 The "no guaran-
tee" nomination is not pursued in this Article.
21'
Beyond the requirement that a foal be born that can stand
and nurse, there are many risks in a live foal venture. For
example, it has been held "that no usage or custom existed"
ensuring that a live foal at any certain date would be "a good,
sound" animal. 252 That holding remains in accord with current
custom. The rule may be different, however, if the mare con-
ceives and/or delivers twins. 2 3 It is well-recognized in the indus-
try that twins are "undesirables since they endanger the mare
and are themselves seldom valuable for racing. 25 4 In such a
case, there is probably no consistent custom to excuse the fee if
twins are born, but at least one court has recognized (but did
not need to enforce) a custom that twins can be aborted by the
mare owner, and thus the fee for the service can be avoided. 25
The minority of contracts that recognize the general problem
of twins solve it either by requiring payment if one twin stands
and nurses, or by placing a choice on the owner of the mare-
24 See, e.g., White v. Williams, 49 S.W. 808 (Ky. 1899).
" See, e.g., Pinkhorn v. Libbey, 45 A. 823 (Me. 1900).
-"I t has been said that despite the unambiguous term "no guarantee," there would
be a guarantee "that the stallion will be breeding sound" at the time of breeding. See
J. LomAs & A. KiRKPATRICK, supra note 99, at 120. The "no guarantee" season has
been regularized by the Matchmaker Breeders Exchange and Stallion Access, two com-
puter-based exchanges for acquiring seasons and shares in stallions within the industry.
With respect to no guarantee seasons on such exchanges, "you're not even guaranteed
the stallion will be alive when your mare is ready to be bred." Id. It is probably fair to
say that these exchanges have changed whatever tradition there was about the no
guarantee season. Even earlier, however, it had been held that once there has been a
breeding on a season sold without "warranty," there is no guarantee that the stallion
will be alive or well enough for the mare to breed back to him if the first breeding does
not effect a conception. See 45 A. at 824.
I-" Steppe v. Farber, 236 N.W. 530 (Wis. 1931). Therefore, it might make a
difference if the agreement were that the foal must stand and nurse unassisted. See note
248 supra.
-" Some contracts (but not more than one-half) call for a "single, live foal." This
is not universal, but is frequent.
Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1975).
2' See id. at 428. The mare owner would be acting in good faith in effecting this
result, giving meaning to an open contract term. See California Lettuce Growers v.
Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785, 790-91 (Cal. 1955). See also Annot., 49 A.L.R.2D 508
(1956) (validity of sales contract as affected by a provision therein giving buyer power
to control price).
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providing that if one or more of the foals is registered with the
Jockey Club, the fee for the season will be owed, but not
otherwise. The practices of foregoing the fee in the case of
abortion, but of paying upon Jockey Club registration, are
widely, if not universally, recognized as duties in the thorough-
bred business. To that extent, they would be included in factor
(g) of the notoriety factors outlined in this Article.2- 6 These
practices are an example of the practice to "work it out" 2- 7-
which, unlike the more variable situations, limit the "work out"
to only two alternatives. 8 If other factors exist-such as a
strong fiduciary relationship-could there sometimes be an en-
forceable custom?
There is one further practice in the thoroughbred business
that enjoys substantial, but less than universal, recognition at
this time. Most stallion service contracts that are executed and
signed provide a space for the owner of the mare to name the
mare that will be bred on the season he purchases. Thus, if a
season is purchased several months, or even years, before a
breeding is to occur, many events could transpire that could
affect the transaction. The named mare, for example, could be
sold. This could happen before the breeding occurs,219 or more
frequently, after the breeding but before the foaling of the
offspring. It was once universally understood and agreed, even
in the absence of a writing, that the sale of a mare during the
period of gestation removed the live foal guarantee, and that
the fee for the season was payable immediately. To one court,
256 See note 180 supra and accompanying text.
2-. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
2I Cf. text accompanying note 140 supra (indicating that a variable "work out"
could not be enforced as a custom).
29 There seems to be no custom in this respect. There is a custom that the season
contract is not transferable; this means that it is not transferable if the mare is sold.
Nevertheless, that custom does not solve the problem-which is that if the mare is sold,
the original owner no longer can breed that mare under his personal contract with the
stallion owner. If the new owner of the mare cannot breed on it, is the contract now
void? That is, does the mare owner who first purchased the season have a free option?
The alternative would be that the original mare owner, making his own performance
impossible, has altered the contract, and now owes the fee on a no guarantee basis.
That is the rule when the mare is sold after conception. The stallion owner presumably
would have some responsibility to minimize his damages if he could resell the season,
but this problem must be solved by some body of law other than custom and usage.
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at least, it was "not clearly apparent why this condition was
annexed, nor how it could be of much importance. ' ' 260 One can
imagine what that court would have said had a party attempted
to convince it that there was a custom to be enforced. The fact
is, however, that the provision for precipitating payment on sale
is central to the transaction. That provision ought to be recog-
nized as a custom, as it was on at least one occasion.26' The
reason is clear to horsemen: The entire notion of a live foal
guarantee places the mare owner in a position of being a sort
of attenuated partner with the stallion owner. Though this is
undoubtedly not a Gentry H fiduciary relationship, it is one that
would call into play the requirement of good faith, forcing the
mare owner to exert every reasonable effort to obtain a live foal
for the benefit of both himself or herself and the owner of the
stallion.262 The practicalities and risk parallel the continuing re-
lationship involved in the foal sharing arrangement. 261 With that
in mind, one can easily see that the name of the mare to be
bred is no more important than the identity of the person who
will be caring for her during her gestation. In fact, despite the
fact that most printed forms require the name of the mare to
be filled in, more often than not the breeder does not do so.
Both parties sign the contract too early for the season purchaser
to know just which mare will be bred on the season he purchases.
In a typical case, then, the person who is to manage the mare,
and the circumstances of her care and foaling, will be of critical
importance. So the sale of the mare properly converts the deal
into a no guarantee sale.
This sort of "partnership", of course, is not a concern with
the no guarantee form of transaction264-the one that seems more
and more to gain acceptance in the business. To what degree,
however, will the changing nature of the business-the greater
arms-length relationship among mare and stallion owners-be
given effect by a court?26
210 Webb v. Smith, 5 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Ark. 1928).
2 1 See Pitchcock v. Donnahor, 66 S.W. 145, 146 (Ark. 1902).
2 See 289 P.2d at 790. See also Annot., 49 A.L.R.2D 508 (1956).
-' See text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
" See Price v. Pepper & Cy., 42 Ky. (13 Bush) 42 (1877). But see Green v. Ryan,
242 I1. App. 466 (1926) (enforcement of a contrary custom in the cattle business).
' For example, on the one membership exchange that permits live foal guarantees,
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All of these issues can be solved by contract. Frequently,
however, they are not. On the exchange where live foal contracts
are traded, most of these open questions are not answered, and
it is still common in the industry to buy and sell a season on a
handshake, or by a two sentence letter that spells out no details
except the year of breeding and the price. In such instances, the
first question that arises is whether there is a contract at all. If
the terms are not "reasonably certain" there is no contract, 26
and the courts will attempt to find whether there is included a
provision for each "essential term" .267 The need for the creation
of a contract is the highest priority-factor (a)-of the policy-
oriented factors that this Article recognizes. 268 Courts commonly
imply that the parties intended to include a reasonable solution
to any open term. Awarding reasonable fees and compensation 69
are the most common examples of this judicial practice. The
comments to the Restatement pull together many of the points
made in this Article in this context:
The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the indication
is that the parties do not intend to be bound; minor items are
more likely to be left to the option of one of the parties or to
what is customary or reasonable.2 0
the seller of the season does not know who is buying the season until after the transaction
is consummated. In fact, on Stallion Access, there is probably no contract at all until
48 hours after the offeror's bid has been accepted by computer. The season owner is
allowed until then to add material terms to the offer, and the possession of the name
of the proposed purchaser may give him or her the incentive to add some stringent
terms.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981).
267 Id. at comment a. See Walker v. Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Ky. 1964); Brooks
v. Smith, 269 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1954). This is a different matter than the U.C.C.'s
statute of frauds, which is considerably more relaxed. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1972)
("writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term"). See also
Mitts & Pettit v. Burger Brewing Co., 317 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky. 1958).
268 See note 176 supra and accompanying text. But see Talamini v. Rosa, 77 S.W.2d
627, 630 (Ky. 1934). An uncertainty can be caused by later agreement or performance-
if the deal has not clearly fallen apart.
I"0 See notes 243, 244 supra. This is the most common use of that technique, with
"reasonable time" running a close second. See, e.g., Crossland v. Kentucky Blue Grass
Seed Grower's Co-op. Ass'n, 103 F.2d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 1939). A horse case incorpo-
rating a "universal racing custom and usage" into the intent of the parties is Centennial
Turf Club v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 271 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Colo. 1954) (analyzing
racing custom to interpret state statute on pari-mutuel wagering).
270 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 comment f (1981).
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This Article does not propose to detail all of the open issues
in a live foal deal, nor even to apply the factors to the ones
here discussed. There are simply too many permutations. A deal
on an exchange between its experienced members may call for a
different result from a negotiated transaction between a breeder
and a newcomer; courses of dealing among the parties, different
equities and utilities will intrude; and different terms will call
for different analyses. Instead, this Article suggests that custom
can supply many essential terms that are open-as can other
legal rules that generally create contract terms by implication.
Indeed, this analysis suggests that without the several consistent
customs to work out these complexities, hundreds of unenforce-
able deals are made every day. There is enough common practice
to give effect to the honor of this industry's traditional practi-
tioners.
CONCLUSION
This Article began by posing the question whether the nature
of the thoroughbred horse business called for substantially dif-
ferent rules in any reasoned way. Having travelled its course, a
couple of answers are apparent. The first is that there are some
areas of law in which the court has no choice but to look to the
customs and usages that surround the transaction before it. The
second is that in a broad range of fact situations, there is no
reason that society cannot permit a colorful business to indulge
its fanciful habits, recognizing the common acceptance of bizarre
risks with consistent expressions of honor. Finally, it seems clear
that from both ends of a continuum of hypothetical situations,
there can be derived a limited number of factors that have been
made by traditional judicial analysis, and that can be regularized
and applied systematically to each question coming before a
modern court.
Each analysis rests on the foundation that so long as it does
not conflict with some concrete interest of the general society,
a particular business will be permitted to write its own script,
sing its own song-especially when the general society can be
enriched by the diversity thus allowed.
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